"Other times it was almost incomprehensible: we’ll debate what happened with Iraq II forever."
It's not incomprehensible if you stick to realpolitik instead of rhetoric.
1) Iraq I was because it was in pretty much nobody's interest to to let Saddam Hussein control the less-expensive-to-extract half of the world's proven oil reserves. Whether Kuwait was inside or outside Iraq really wasn't a matter of intense interest to the US or anybody else; rather, the US and pretty much everybody else wanted an outcome where Hussein could not use military force to control the oil of the whole Arabian Peninsula.
2) In the end, the ground phase of Desert Storm was a failure, because Saddam Hussein and his regime survived (against the expectations of the Bush I administration that it would be shattered by a civil war), complete with the chance to rebuild his military to threaten the Arabian Peninsula again. The US had to, in practice, indefinitely extend Desert Shield and the air phase of Desert Storm (garrisoning Saudi Arabia and enforcing the no-fly zones) to indefinitely contain Hussein.
3) Containing Hussein became untenable because the US presence in Saudi Arabia provoked an escalating series of terrorist attacks by Arab Muslims who saw it as a desecration. The Khobar Towers, the US embassies in Africa, and the USS Cole culminated in 9/11. Remaining in Saudi Arabia would continue to provoke similar attacks, because plenty of Arab Muslims agreed with Osama bin Laden about that desecration enough to do something about it. A US withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, would end the ongoing offense.
4) But simply pulling out would end the containment. The logical move for the US accordingly seemed to be to repeat the Desert Storm ground invasion, and this time not stop until the Hussein regime was indisputably destroyed. WMD programs and democracy were advanced as excuses in public for the same reason Iraq being an aggressor was advanced to justify the first invasion of Iraq; because US and world public opinion won't tolerate a simple explanation of "The invasion is in our interest, so we're launching one".
(4a - The huge difference in international support between Iraq I and Iraq II is that many countries that saw it in their interest to not let Hussein dominate the Arabian Peninsula didn't have any particular interest in taking domestic PR hits in the interest of easing US efforts to resolve its Saudi garrison difficulty by invading Iraq.)
5) The US invaded Iraq, disbanded the Iraqi government and army, and went ahead and declared "Mission Accomplished". Unfortunately, it couldn't immediately go home (leaving just a few advisors in Baghdad), because Hussein himself managed to hide in a spider hole. There was an ongoing risk that if the US withdrew, he'd manage to wind up on top again, and the whole problem would start over.
6) Between when the US wanted to withdraw and when Saddam Hussein would up in custody (December), the civil war that was an entirely expected result of shattering the Hussein regime (even desired, since it would put off the date a stable regime in Iraq could threaten the Arabian Peninsula) broke out. With fighting going on before US troops left, there was no way compatible with American public opinion to simply declare victory and go home, like would have happened Hussein been killed in the same fight his sons died in. This public opinion is why the major Democratic candidates for President talked about a Pottery Barn rule.
7) Every hour the US was in Iraq from the point of Hussein's capture onward, including Obama sending troops back in after he withdrew them, accordingly was the US administration of the day trying to figure out how to leave without the American people perceiving it as a defeat and punishing the party of whomever was President.
"Other times it was almost incomprehensible: we’ll debate what happened with Iraq II forever."
It's not incomprehensible if you stick to realpolitik instead of rhetoric.
1) Iraq I was because it was in pretty much nobody's interest to to let Saddam Hussein control the less-expensive-to-extract half of the world's proven oil reserves. Whether Kuwait was inside or outside Iraq really wasn't a matter of intense interest to the US or anybody else; rather, the US and pretty much everybody else wanted an outcome where Hussein could not use military force to control the oil of the whole Arabian Peninsula.
2) In the end, the ground phase of Desert Storm was a failure, because Saddam Hussein and his regime survived (against the expectations of the Bush I administration that it would be shattered by a civil war), complete with the chance to rebuild his military to threaten the Arabian Peninsula again. The US had to, in practice, indefinitely extend Desert Shield and the air phase of Desert Storm (garrisoning Saudi Arabia and enforcing the no-fly zones) to indefinitely contain Hussein.
3) Containing Hussein became untenable because the US presence in Saudi Arabia provoked an escalating series of terrorist attacks by Arab Muslims who saw it as a desecration. The Khobar Towers, the US embassies in Africa, and the USS Cole culminated in 9/11. Remaining in Saudi Arabia would continue to provoke similar attacks, because plenty of Arab Muslims agreed with Osama bin Laden about that desecration enough to do something about it. A US withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, would end the ongoing offense.
4) But simply pulling out would end the containment. The logical move for the US accordingly seemed to be to repeat the Desert Storm ground invasion, and this time not stop until the Hussein regime was indisputably destroyed. WMD programs and democracy were advanced as excuses in public for the same reason Iraq being an aggressor was advanced to justify the first invasion of Iraq; because US and world public opinion won't tolerate a simple explanation of "The invasion is in our interest, so we're launching one".
(4a - The huge difference in international support between Iraq I and Iraq II is that many countries that saw it in their interest to not let Hussein dominate the Arabian Peninsula didn't have any particular interest in taking domestic PR hits in the interest of easing US efforts to resolve its Saudi garrison difficulty by invading Iraq.)
5) The US invaded Iraq, disbanded the Iraqi government and army, and went ahead and declared "Mission Accomplished". Unfortunately, it couldn't immediately go home (leaving just a few advisors in Baghdad), because Hussein himself managed to hide in a spider hole. There was an ongoing risk that if the US withdrew, he'd manage to wind up on top again, and the whole problem would start over.
6) Between when the US wanted to withdraw and when Saddam Hussein would up in custody (December), the civil war that was an entirely expected result of shattering the Hussein regime (even desired, since it would put off the date a stable regime in Iraq could threaten the Arabian Peninsula) broke out. With fighting going on before US troops left, there was no way compatible with American public opinion to simply declare victory and go home, like would have happened Hussein been killed in the same fight his sons died in. This public opinion is why the major Democratic candidates for President talked about a Pottery Barn rule.
7) Every hour the US was in Iraq from the point of Hussein's capture onward, including Obama sending troops back in after he withdrew them, accordingly was the US administration of the day trying to figure out how to leave without the American people perceiving it as a defeat and punishing the party of whomever was President.