More than hype: Summit shows that the Quad is already coming of age

To understand how far the Quad has come in a short period, consider its ministerial just a year ago. No joint statement emerged, and Indian documents would not even use the term “Quad.” But, on September 24, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the US held their second summit in six months, this time in person. And their joint statement reflected concrete progress since March. The Quad is never going to meet everyone’s expectations — it is a vessel into which many hopes are placed, and it cannot and should not be a one-stop shop. But the summit and deliverables signal that the countries today have a greater willingness and ability to act together.

The “deliverables” included further concretisation and enhancement of the Covid-19 vaccine initiative, the commencement of vaccine distribution, a pandemic preparedness exercise, a Quad STEM fellowship, Quad technology principles, a leader-level cybersecurity initiative, a green shipping network, a clean-hydrogen partnership, 5G deployment, and a semiconductor supply chain initiative, as well as new groups or task forces on space, climate and infrastructure coordination.

These initiatives reflect the four democracies’ desire to demonstrate they can “get things done.” They signaled that the Quad members have an eye to the future, in which they are investing, while also helping each other and the region tackle current challenges like Covid, climate change and China’s assertiveness. And, given the more complex regional environment, they indicate the Quad’s continuing intention to collaborate, including with other like-minded Indo-Pacific and European partners.

Quad countries clearly recognise that the grouping needs to deliver. The vaccine initiative, which can benefit not just peoples’ lives but also their livelihoods, is crucial from this perspective, and a new dashboard gives the region the ability to hold them to account. Additionally, it can be proof of concept of the Quad, showing that countries can pool capabilities, comparative advantages, and share the burden to deliver practical solutions to regional problems — and do so in collaboration with regional and multilateral institutions. The initiative could help reassure Southeast Asian and other regional states, and counter Chinese critiques of the Quad either being useless or a destabilising anti-China bloc.
While there is little doubt that the Quad is building a balancing coalition, the countries chose to highlight another priority: building resilience in the region, whether in the maritime, economic, technology, health or climate domains or in terms of the rules-based order. Members outlined their approach to this, including understanding vulnerabilities, information sharing, offering alternatives, building capacity, setting higher standards, and innovating. This emphasis is designed to convey a desire to strengthen both Quad members’ and other countries’ ability to deter, detect, and defend against challenges, and, more positively, to add value in the region.

Other aspects evident from the summit and documents are the growing institutionalisation (without formalisation) of the Quad, and the networks being created across the four countries within and outside government. The “informal grouping” now has annual leaders’ and ministers’ meetings, regular senior official meetings, working groups, and sherpas and sous-sherpas in each government to help coordinate. This will further build familiarity and habits of cooperation and could improve the ability to manage differences.

The initiatives, and the approaches the Quad intends to follow — diplomatic coordination, standard setting, innovating together — will potentially also establish or increase connectivities across multiple domains in the four countries. The Quad STEM fellowship, for instance, involves stakeholders in governments, foundations, the private sector, and universities, and will develop a collaborative talent pool and network that will have a long-term impact.

While there was no “defence” section, many of the areas of cooperation listed have critical security components to them, particularly in the technology, maritime, and space domains. And regional security (Afghanistan and Indo-Pacific) was clearly on the agenda. Moreover, lack of mention does not mean lack of action—as a more sophisticated MALABAR exercise demonstrates (as does a reported meeting of the countries’ security chiefs).
As usual, China was also not mentioned explicitly, but its assertiveness provided the subtext. It was evident in how the leaders described their contrasting regional vision, the challenges the region is facing, as well as in the solutions the Quad is offering.
There are questions ahead. One is about the lack of a trade agenda, though this is more Delhi and Washington’s challenge. A second is bandwidth, given the expansive agenda. Another is coalition management across several groupings. But perhaps the greatest challenge comes from within — as the vaccine initiative’s link with the state of India’s health security and governance capacity demonstrates, the Quad members’ ability to deliver abroad will only be as good as their strength at home.