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The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914
The First World War followed a period of sustained peace in Europe during which people talked with confidence of prosperity, progress, and hope. But in 1914, Europe walked into a catastrophic conflict that killed millions, bled its economies dry, shook empires and societies to pieces, and fatally undermined Europe’s dominance of the world. It was a war that could have been avoided up to the last moment—so why did it happen?
Beginning in the early nineteenth century and ending with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, award-winning historian Margaret Macmillan uncovers the huge political and technological changes, national decisions, and just as important, the small moments of human muddle and weakness that led Europe from peace to disaster. This masterful exploration of how Europe chose its path towards war will change and enrich how we see this defining moment in history.
Beginning in the early nineteenth century and ending with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, award-winning historian Margaret Macmillan uncovers the huge political and technological changes, national decisions, and just as important, the small moments of human muddle and weakness that led Europe from peace to disaster. This masterful exploration of how Europe chose its path towards war will change and enrich how we see this defining moment in history.
739 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 2013
About the author
Margaret MacMillan
44 books686 followersMargaret Olwen MacMillan OC D.Phil. (born 1943) is a historian and professor at Oxford University where she is Warden of St. Antony's College. She is former provost of Trinity College and professor of history at the University of Toronto. A well-respected expert on history and current affairs, MacMillan is a frequent commentator in the media.
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June 22, 2018
Lately, those around me have discovered something disconcerting: my attempts to shift all conversation to the topic of the First World War. I can’t help it; I’m obsessed. At dinner, if my wife asks me about my day, I reply: “Better than the English on the first day of the Somme.” When my little daughter says, “Dada, milk,” I tell her she’s as helpless as an Austro-Hungarian field marshal. At the bar, when others try to talk about the National Football League, I’m busy trying to kick-start an exchange on the League of Nations.
It didn’t used to be this way. Just a couple years ago, World War I was simply something I ignored while reading about World War II. Now, though, it’s a topic I can’t get enough of. The personalities! The miscalculations! The repercussions! World War I was a true fork in the road of world history. Had it not occurred, things today would be unimaginably different.
With the centennial of World War I’s opening salvos less than a year away, this is a great time to get interested. Publishers are releasing a glut of new books timed to take advantage of the upcoming anniversary.
Margaret MacMillan’s The War That Ended Peace is one of these releases. It covers the first fourteen years of the 20th century and ends just as Germany invades Belgium. (This invasion was somehow the result of the assassination of an Austrian archduke in a Bosnian city by a Serbian assassin. It’s entirely illogical and complex until you’ve read your fifth or sixth book on the subject. Afterwards, it’s still illogical and complex, but you will be able to explain it to your disinterested friends after you’ve consumed a bottle of wine).
MacMillan previously wrote a well-received book on the post-war Peace Conference called Paris 1919. That volume did not start until the guns fell silence. In this book, she covers the years of tremulous “peace” in Europe, before the guns started firing. This was a time of new alliances, rearranged power dynamics, and small, local conflicts that either a) made likely peace could be maintained through treaty and the threat of force or b) made war absolutely inevitable.
This territory has been covered before. One of my favorite books, Robert Massie’s Dreadnought, covers all the same beats: the German naval buildup; the formation of the Entente Cordiale; the Moroccan crises; etc.
Like Massie, one of MacMillan’s great strengths as a writer is her biographical sketches of the figures – both well-known and obscure – who move across the cluttered stage. Usually with just a paragraph or two, she perceptively (and entertainingly) fleshes out the people whose decisions cumulatively moved Europe towards its cataclysm. This skill is priceless, because these people are characters. They run a ridiculous gamut of complexities and contradictions. The hysterical Kaiser Wilhelm, so much like the schoolyard bully, always talking tough, usually backing down. The tragically dim Nicholas II, who would have been better off as a village postmaster, seeking solace in his happy marriage while his nation dissolved internally. The ludicrous Count Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, who eagerly sought a war as a way to convince his mistress to divorce her husband and marry him. These are people too outré to have actually existed. But they did. And no matter how many times I read about them, it’s still interesting.
Unlike other writers, who have taken a standard, chronological approach, MacMillan’s book is more thematic and analytical. She starts in 1900, at the Paris Exposition, and uses this hopeful moment to set the scene for all that is to come.
Subsequent chapters tend to focus on a single area, covering that matter in-depth, rather than parsing out the discussion throughout a longer, book-length narrative. For instance, MacMillan devotes a chapter each to Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France, and the relationship between England and Russia. There is an entire chapter devoted to the war plans of the various countries, giving you several different perspectives from the inside looking out. (And there are so many perspectives! A Great Britain that exists only because of its naval supremacy, jealously guarding that prerogative; a France that has already lost chunks of territory to its eastern neighbor; a Germany that feels surrounded by potential enemies, one of which – Russia – could someday be overwhelmingly strong… All this added up to a bias in favor of offensive, rather than defensive war)
At some point, around page 400, the book clicks into a narrative gear. From that moment on, MacMillan takes us – rather briskly – through the growing number of flare-ups that heightened tensions between the powers, and created expectations among leaders and diplomats, that eventually resulted in war. Those flare-ups include two Moroccan crises (with Germany and France vying for colonial influence) and the two Balkan Wars (which excited the pan-Serbian sentiments that helped fuel Gavrilo Princip on his way to Sarajevo).
Having read several different versions of this same story, I found I really enjoyed MacMillan’s presentation. By carefully frontloading the background information (the political organizations, the geography, the economics), she is able to bring better clarity to obscure little moments that had profound consequences. Take, for example, the Agadir Crisis. When I first started reading about World War I, I couldn’t understand how a single German gunboat (the Panther) sailing into a Moroccan port could bring two nations (Germany and France) to the brink of war. Here, however, MacMillan has already explained the geopolitical context so well (from the perspectives of both nations, their leaders, their diplomats, and their public sentiments) that it all makes a certain amount of sense (if you squint real hard).
Since this time-period is already well-covered ground, it’s important to factor literary merits into the value equation. On the whole, I found MacMillan to be a wonderful writer. I’ve already mentioned her historical portraiture. She is also good at finding small, illuminating details.
At times, oddly enough, she will deliver a really clunky sentence. For a person who works at Oxford, she doesn’t really utilize the Oxford comma, which makes for some strange run-on sentences. Other sentences will have the exact opposite problem, with commas and clauses strewn like barbed wire, snagging the reader’s eye. In other words, the book is not seamless in quality. The generally high quality makes the bad writing stick out all the worse.
MacMillan also has a tendency to relate things to the present-day, or to other historical moments. Since she wrote a book on Nixon and Mao, there are a lot of allusions to Nixon and Mao. Analogies can be a useful thing, but since she never develops them, they come off as facile.
There is also a distinct lack of space devoted to the Balkans itself, which generated the spark that lit the powder keg. I think I’m probably sensitive to this, since I just recently finished Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers, which pretty much tells this same story, except with the focus on Serbia. Even so, MacMillan could have spent more time on this matter, and I wish she had.
World War I is a daunting event to read about. For years I avoided it, preferring the black-hat-white-hat simplicity of World War II. (Nazis = Bad; Americans = Hell yeah!). Reading more about the subject does not necessarily make it less complex or more understandable. But it does make those complexities into something of a virtue. The road to World War I is a rich historical tale, and The War That Ended Peace tells it very well.
It didn’t used to be this way. Just a couple years ago, World War I was simply something I ignored while reading about World War II. Now, though, it’s a topic I can’t get enough of. The personalities! The miscalculations! The repercussions! World War I was a true fork in the road of world history. Had it not occurred, things today would be unimaginably different.
With the centennial of World War I’s opening salvos less than a year away, this is a great time to get interested. Publishers are releasing a glut of new books timed to take advantage of the upcoming anniversary.
Margaret MacMillan’s The War That Ended Peace is one of these releases. It covers the first fourteen years of the 20th century and ends just as Germany invades Belgium. (This invasion was somehow the result of the assassination of an Austrian archduke in a Bosnian city by a Serbian assassin. It’s entirely illogical and complex until you’ve read your fifth or sixth book on the subject. Afterwards, it’s still illogical and complex, but you will be able to explain it to your disinterested friends after you’ve consumed a bottle of wine).
MacMillan previously wrote a well-received book on the post-war Peace Conference called Paris 1919. That volume did not start until the guns fell silence. In this book, she covers the years of tremulous “peace” in Europe, before the guns started firing. This was a time of new alliances, rearranged power dynamics, and small, local conflicts that either a) made likely peace could be maintained through treaty and the threat of force or b) made war absolutely inevitable.
This territory has been covered before. One of my favorite books, Robert Massie’s Dreadnought, covers all the same beats: the German naval buildup; the formation of the Entente Cordiale; the Moroccan crises; etc.
Like Massie, one of MacMillan’s great strengths as a writer is her biographical sketches of the figures – both well-known and obscure – who move across the cluttered stage. Usually with just a paragraph or two, she perceptively (and entertainingly) fleshes out the people whose decisions cumulatively moved Europe towards its cataclysm. This skill is priceless, because these people are characters. They run a ridiculous gamut of complexities and contradictions. The hysterical Kaiser Wilhelm, so much like the schoolyard bully, always talking tough, usually backing down. The tragically dim Nicholas II, who would have been better off as a village postmaster, seeking solace in his happy marriage while his nation dissolved internally. The ludicrous Count Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, who eagerly sought a war as a way to convince his mistress to divorce her husband and marry him. These are people too outré to have actually existed. But they did. And no matter how many times I read about them, it’s still interesting.
Unlike other writers, who have taken a standard, chronological approach, MacMillan’s book is more thematic and analytical. She starts in 1900, at the Paris Exposition, and uses this hopeful moment to set the scene for all that is to come.
Germany’s pavilion was surmounted by a statue of a herald blowing a trumpet, suitable perhaps, for the newest of the great European powers. Inside was an exact reproduction of Frederick the Great’s library; tactfully, the Germans did not focus on his military victories, many of them over France. The western façade hinted, though, at a new rivalry, the one which was developing between Germany and the world’s greatest naval power, Great Britain: a panel showed a stormy sea with sirens calling and had a motto rumored to be written by Germany’s ruler, Kaiser Wilhelm II, himself: “Fortune’s star invites the courageous man to pull up anchor and throw himself into the conquest of the waves.” Elsewhere at the Exposition were reminders of the rapidly burgeoning power of a country that had only come into existence in 1871; the Palace of Electricity contained a giant crane from Germany that could lift 25,000 kilos…
Subsequent chapters tend to focus on a single area, covering that matter in-depth, rather than parsing out the discussion throughout a longer, book-length narrative. For instance, MacMillan devotes a chapter each to Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France, and the relationship between England and Russia. There is an entire chapter devoted to the war plans of the various countries, giving you several different perspectives from the inside looking out. (And there are so many perspectives! A Great Britain that exists only because of its naval supremacy, jealously guarding that prerogative; a France that has already lost chunks of territory to its eastern neighbor; a Germany that feels surrounded by potential enemies, one of which – Russia – could someday be overwhelmingly strong… All this added up to a bias in favor of offensive, rather than defensive war)
The problem confronting [Chief of Staff Alfred von Schlieffen] was that the alliance between France and Russia which was developing throughout the 1890s presented Germany with the nightmare possibility of war on two fronts. Germany could not afford to divide its forces to fight all-out wars on both of those fronts so it would have to engage in a holding action on one side while it struck hard on the other to gain a quick victory. “Germany must strive, therefore,” he wrote, “first, to strike down one of these allies while the other is kept occupied; but then when the one antagonist is conquered, it must, by exploiting its railroads, bring a superiority of numbers to the other theater of war, which will destroy the other enemy.” While he initially thought of striking first at Russia, Schlieffen had changed his mind by the turn of the century: Russia was strengthening its forts to give it a strong defensive line running north to south through its Polish territories and building railways which would make it easier to bring up reinforcements…It made sense, therefore, for Germany to stay on the defensive in the east and deal with Russia’s ally France first.
At some point, around page 400, the book clicks into a narrative gear. From that moment on, MacMillan takes us – rather briskly – through the growing number of flare-ups that heightened tensions between the powers, and created expectations among leaders and diplomats, that eventually resulted in war. Those flare-ups include two Moroccan crises (with Germany and France vying for colonial influence) and the two Balkan Wars (which excited the pan-Serbian sentiments that helped fuel Gavrilo Princip on his way to Sarajevo).
Having read several different versions of this same story, I found I really enjoyed MacMillan’s presentation. By carefully frontloading the background information (the political organizations, the geography, the economics), she is able to bring better clarity to obscure little moments that had profound consequences. Take, for example, the Agadir Crisis. When I first started reading about World War I, I couldn’t understand how a single German gunboat (the Panther) sailing into a Moroccan port could bring two nations (Germany and France) to the brink of war. Here, however, MacMillan has already explained the geopolitical context so well (from the perspectives of both nations, their leaders, their diplomats, and their public sentiments) that it all makes a certain amount of sense (if you squint real hard).
Since this time-period is already well-covered ground, it’s important to factor literary merits into the value equation. On the whole, I found MacMillan to be a wonderful writer. I’ve already mentioned her historical portraiture. She is also good at finding small, illuminating details.
At times, oddly enough, she will deliver a really clunky sentence. For a person who works at Oxford, she doesn’t really utilize the Oxford comma, which makes for some strange run-on sentences. Other sentences will have the exact opposite problem, with commas and clauses strewn like barbed wire, snagging the reader’s eye. In other words, the book is not seamless in quality. The generally high quality makes the bad writing stick out all the worse.
MacMillan also has a tendency to relate things to the present-day, or to other historical moments. Since she wrote a book on Nixon and Mao, there are a lot of allusions to Nixon and Mao. Analogies can be a useful thing, but since she never develops them, they come off as facile.
There is also a distinct lack of space devoted to the Balkans itself, which generated the spark that lit the powder keg. I think I’m probably sensitive to this, since I just recently finished Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers, which pretty much tells this same story, except with the focus on Serbia. Even so, MacMillan could have spent more time on this matter, and I wish she had.
World War I is a daunting event to read about. For years I avoided it, preferring the black-hat-white-hat simplicity of World War II. (Nazis = Bad; Americans = Hell yeah!). Reading more about the subject does not necessarily make it less complex or more understandable. But it does make those complexities into something of a virtue. The road to World War I is a rich historical tale, and The War That Ended Peace tells it very well.
February 16, 2016
I want to kick myself for not being able to attend when Margaret Macmillan visited Madrid recently to present her book.
She is the great grand daughter of David Lloyd George (1863-1945), the British politician from the Liberal party who was Chancellor of the Exchequer when WW1 broke out but became Prime Minister during the contention.
But it is not thanks to her kinship but to her own academic acumen that she is the current Warden at Saint Antony’s College, a think tank for historians. For me this also means, facetiously, that I think I know exactly where she lives.
I have read this magnificent account of the years leading to the outbreak of the war, soon after reading The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, which deals exactly with the same topic and which was also an extraordinary read.
And may be this was a good thing, or a bad thing, for if I was more familiar with many of the facts, my opinion was also already shaped. I had liked in particular Clark’s non-Anglo way of looking at the developments, and was also well convinced by his persuasive arguments.
So, I was a bit taken aback when after an excellent introductory chapter on the general self-satisfaction and complacency that was enjoyed by Europeans at the turn of the twentieth century (similar to the way we feel now?), she chose then to proceed with Great Britain as the grounding stone of her understanding of the period. This was very different from Clark’s dramatic start with the troublesome Serbia.
After zeroing in on Great Britain, she then proceeds, in a very engaging, very flowing and with a very clear language, with her review of the other great powers. That is: Germany, followed by Germany and then Germany again. Then France and back to Britain, to which Russia, and again Britain follow. We then move to Austro-Hungary and revisit once again Germany.
This was a very different approach from Sleepwalkers, which had put the Balkans at the forefront. Which means not treating them as a conglomerate but as Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and all their crossed relationships.
For it is in Britain, France, Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary, and not the Balkans, nor the Ottomans, nor Italy and her Libya, where she is searching for the igniting impetus. This is because she identifies the Naval race, which begins early enough in the new century between Britain and Germany, as the most important destabilizing factor. The rivalry between these two contenders with the huge amount of resources, and pride, invested in this race meant that they were playing with fire. An opportunity to prove that this investment had been worthwhile and fully justified would be difficult to resist.
But don’t mistake me. I am not saying who out of these two historians is right. I am not qualified to emit such an opinion. Macmillan’s is certainly a superb procession through what was going on with these superpowers. At the end of the nineteenth century Europe was a balance of balances, but within a relatively short time span two opposing big blocks had formed. The account of how this happened appeared at times a bit befuddling in Sleepwalkers as I indicated in my review. Macmillan’s version seemed clearer. In her walking us through the various determinant players I felt more observant. Or may be in my second walk I no longer felt as blindfolded by my ignorance.
After the survey of the various powers Macmillan then unfolds the chronology and takes stock of the Russo-Japanese war, the first and second Moroccan crises, the Bosnian annexation, the Libyan invasion, the first and second Balkan wars, and the blazing assassination.
But her attention is well focused on the decisions of the few individuals, very few of them, who in the five years prior to the war eventually decided the start it. For she maintains that we can point fingers and that none of the signalled candidates were exceptional figures. There was no Bismarck among them.
Macmillan however also realizes that individuals in their decision-making are shaped by their world. Large historical trends, such as Imperialism, technological and scientific developments, financial Budgets, Nationalisms and domestic tensions, Peace movements, rivalries in the reigning families etc. All of these constitute the scenario in which the doers had to act. And it was later on in my reading that I realized that when she was surveying the big powers she was actually developing these continuous and broad themes as well.
Her account of the last years moves fast and dynamically. One feels the anxiety of impending doom as one peels off the last sheets of the calendar and we approach the abyss when that fatal 4th of August faces us. Her epilogue is a welcomed survey of what happened to the main personalities as some fell into the void while others didn’t.
One can easily guess that Macmillan is a pacifist. And her final thesis is that the war need not have happened. For even if her account follows the logic of events that seem to lead you in a deterministic path, she insists that the final failure was the inability to stand up to those who said there was no choice left but to go to war. There are always choices.
Macmillan considers that a certain amount of blundering took place all along leading Europe to the war. So, after all, and in spite of my first impression, she and Clark do not seem to disagree. Blundering...Sleepwalking. What is the difference?
In an interview Margaret Macmillan said that President Kennedy, when he was advised by his military that he should send the missiles during the Cuban crisis, decided not to because his recent read of The Guns of August had made him think otherwise.
I was also then relieved to learn that Angela Merkel has lately read Sleepwalkers, and hopefully will have read Macmillan's account as well for these two books complement each other so well. In spite of our current complacency, with the current Crimea crisis we want our political leaders to walk and discern in full alertness.
October 13, 2019
Margaret Macmillan is a Canadian historian who is teaching at Oxford University. She is the great-granddaughter of David Lloyd George, Britain’s wartime Prime Minister. I recently read Max Hastings “Catastrophe 1914”. He and Macmillan are covering the same nine months leading up to the war. Hasting covered the role of general staff of rival governments showing a step by step documentation leading up to war. MacMillan on the other hand covers the diplomats and politicians showing step by step how they had avoided war numerous time and why this occasion they failed. Even though Macmillan’s book is scholarly it is very readable.
She has the ability to evoke the world at the beginning of the 20th Century, when Europe had gone 85 years without a general war between great powers. In these years there was an explosion of production, wealth and a transformation in society and the way people lived. Food was better and cheaper, dramatic advances in hygiene and medicine, faster communications including cheap public telegraphs. Macmillan asks “why would Europe want to throw it all away?” In the middle of the book Macmillan considers the larger context within which the final approach to war occurred. She is good at painting the intellectual background of “social Darwinism.” The author does a good job dealing with the July crisis and distributes the responsibility widely. It was created by Serbia irresponsibility, Austrian vengefulness, and the “Blank check” the Kaiser issued to Vienna. She recognizes how Britain’s, French and especially Russian actions exacerbated the crisis and rejects the view that this was a German pre-emptive strike, a “flight forward” from domestic strife into war, while arguing that German politics recklessly and knowingly risked war. I think she is right on both counts. Macmillan makes it clear wars are not inevitable there are always choices.
I read this as an audio book. Richard Burnip did an excellent job narrating this 32 hour book. This book is a must for anyone interested in WWI history.
She has the ability to evoke the world at the beginning of the 20th Century, when Europe had gone 85 years without a general war between great powers. In these years there was an explosion of production, wealth and a transformation in society and the way people lived. Food was better and cheaper, dramatic advances in hygiene and medicine, faster communications including cheap public telegraphs. Macmillan asks “why would Europe want to throw it all away?” In the middle of the book Macmillan considers the larger context within which the final approach to war occurred. She is good at painting the intellectual background of “social Darwinism.” The author does a good job dealing with the July crisis and distributes the responsibility widely. It was created by Serbia irresponsibility, Austrian vengefulness, and the “Blank check” the Kaiser issued to Vienna. She recognizes how Britain’s, French and especially Russian actions exacerbated the crisis and rejects the view that this was a German pre-emptive strike, a “flight forward” from domestic strife into war, while arguing that German politics recklessly and knowingly risked war. I think she is right on both counts. Macmillan makes it clear wars are not inevitable there are always choices.
I read this as an audio book. Richard Burnip did an excellent job narrating this 32 hour book. This book is a must for anyone interested in WWI history.
November 18, 2016
Margaret MacMillian’s The War That Ended Peace: The Road To 1914 could not be better. I have to confess that when I opened the first page I was practically ignorant as to what caused the Great War. I only remember from high school that the war and specifically that the invasion by Belgium by Germany was the result of the assassination of an Austrian archduke, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, by a Serbian assassin. I did not know all the personalities involved, or the intricacies of the alliances that helped push for the conflict, that set in a motion a destruction machine that was virtually unstoppable and lasted four years killing roughly 20 million people, with repercussion that extend to the present. According to MacMillian it can be traced back to almost everything the world became in its worst: WWII, Communism, artillery warfare, arms races, and a divided mercurial world.
The questioning of whether war could be avoided, assuming decision makers had made different choices at crucial moments, guided MacMillian to deliver a remarkable analysis of the years prior to 1914 to unravel the scenario of that time to answer the question of what led to the end of peace:
From the optimistic climate of the 1900 Paris Exposition MacMillian relieves the next 14 years in its more bewildering events, but what I found particularly insightful was the analysis of the main figures that tragically lead to events that could have perhaps be prevented, if not for their weakness and intrinsic conflicts. “Forces, ideas, prejudices, institutions, conflicts, all are surely important. Yet that still leaves the individuals, not in the end that many of them, who had to say yes, go ahead and unleash war, or no, stop.” There was the Kaiser Wilheim of Germany, the tsar of Russia and the Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary, while other leaders (the President of France, the Prime Ministers of Britain and Italy), were inserted in constitutional regimes.
Not a Churchill as an influential figure existed like in in the 1930's, with insight and sagacity to see what Hitler was about prior to WWII, and despite that already in Parliament could do nothing besides persistently warning of the danger ahead, as he had no power to drive Britain in a different direction. So it seems to show that not only the presence of more fitting and prepared individuals, but the circunstances are essencial to the outcome of history.
For me, as a beginner, one of MacMillan’s great strengths as a writer was how she paints the individual sketches of the figures – both well-known and obscure – who move across the cluttered stage. Usually with just a paragraph or two, she perceptively (and entertainingly) fleshes out the people whose decisions cumulatively moved Europe towards its cataclysm. This skill is priceless, when dealing with historical characters. Her objects here present a ridiculous gamut of complexities and contradictions. The hysterical Kaiser Wilhelm, so much like the schoolyard bully, always talking tough, usually backing down. The tragically dim Nicholas II, who would have been better off as a village postmaster, seeking solace in his relatively happy marriage while his nation dissolved internally. The ludicrous Count Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, who apparently eagerly sought the war as a way to convince his mistress to divorce her husband and marry him. Besides many others. These are people too outré to have actually existed. But they did. And no matter how many times I read about them, there is always more to learn.
It is important that I fully enjoyed this amazing book! Despite its own reward, the fact that it was my reintroduction to non-fiction, after a period dedicated to fiction, reading of the theme was the trigger to further my interests. Since them I have been relishing every time I read about both wars, and could say I am feeling a little more knowledgeable to have a better a perception of the World Wars. It was an excellent beginning.
5 plus stars for Margaret MacMillian’s The War That Ended Peace: The Road To 1914, highly recommended for anyone that enjoys history, nonfiction books or simply high-quality books!
The questioning of whether war could be avoided, assuming decision makers had made different choices at crucial moments, guided MacMillian to deliver a remarkable analysis of the years prior to 1914 to unravel the scenario of that time to answer the question of what led to the end of peace:
“We also remember the Great War because it was such a puzzle. How could Europe have done this to itself and to the world? There are many possible explanations; indeed, so many that it is difficult to choose among them. For a start the arms race, rigid military plans, economic rivalry, trade wars, imperialism with its scramble for colonies, or the alliance system dividing Europe into unfriendly camps. Ideas and emotions often crossed national boundaries: nationalism with its unsavoury riders of hatred and contempt for others; fears, of loss or revolution, of terrorists and anarchists; hopes, for change or a better world; the demands of honour and manliness which meant not backing down or appealing weak; or Social Darwinism which ranked human societies as if they were species and which promoted a faith not merely in evolution and progress but in the inevitability of struggle. And what about the role of individual nations and their motivations: … How did these all play their part in keeping Europe’s long peace or moving it towards war?“
From the optimistic climate of the 1900 Paris Exposition MacMillian relieves the next 14 years in its more bewildering events, but what I found particularly insightful was the analysis of the main figures that tragically lead to events that could have perhaps be prevented, if not for their weakness and intrinsic conflicts. “Forces, ideas, prejudices, institutions, conflicts, all are surely important. Yet that still leaves the individuals, not in the end that many of them, who had to say yes, go ahead and unleash war, or no, stop.” There was the Kaiser Wilheim of Germany, the tsar of Russia and the Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary, while other leaders (the President of France, the Prime Ministers of Britain and Italy), were inserted in constitutional regimes.
“It was Europe’s and the world’s tragedy in retrospect that none of the key players in 1914 were great and imaginative leaders who had the courage to stand out against the pressures building up for war.”
Not a Churchill as an influential figure existed like in in the 1930's, with insight and sagacity to see what Hitler was about prior to WWII, and despite that already in Parliament could do nothing besides persistently warning of the danger ahead, as he had no power to drive Britain in a different direction. So it seems to show that not only the presence of more fitting and prepared individuals, but the circunstances are essencial to the outcome of history.
For me, as a beginner, one of MacMillan’s great strengths as a writer was how she paints the individual sketches of the figures – both well-known and obscure – who move across the cluttered stage. Usually with just a paragraph or two, she perceptively (and entertainingly) fleshes out the people whose decisions cumulatively moved Europe towards its cataclysm. This skill is priceless, when dealing with historical characters. Her objects here present a ridiculous gamut of complexities and contradictions. The hysterical Kaiser Wilhelm, so much like the schoolyard bully, always talking tough, usually backing down. The tragically dim Nicholas II, who would have been better off as a village postmaster, seeking solace in his relatively happy marriage while his nation dissolved internally. The ludicrous Count Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, who apparently eagerly sought the war as a way to convince his mistress to divorce her husband and marry him. Besides many others. These are people too outré to have actually existed. But they did. And no matter how many times I read about them, there is always more to learn.
It is important that I fully enjoyed this amazing book! Despite its own reward, the fact that it was my reintroduction to non-fiction, after a period dedicated to fiction, reading of the theme was the trigger to further my interests. Since them I have been relishing every time I read about both wars, and could say I am feeling a little more knowledgeable to have a better a perception of the World Wars. It was an excellent beginning.
5 plus stars for Margaret MacMillian’s The War That Ended Peace: The Road To 1914, highly recommended for anyone that enjoys history, nonfiction books or simply high-quality books!
April 29, 2023
An excellent summation of all of the events, both little and big, that culminated in the start of World War 1. Margaret MacMillan does a masterful job of weaving together all the different characters on the world stage and the little crises that managed to eventually push them all off the cliff towards ruin. A fascinating book and one I'd highly recommend.
April 7, 2024
A truly superb and valuable account of how the great European powers found themselves lumbering into a war that would not last until Christmas, but became a conflagration that would to see millions die and also change the face of the continent and its political and national boundaries in ways unimagined or foreseen.
There are over seven hundred reviews of this book on Goodreads so my adding a lengthy in-depth exposition will add little overall. Therefore, I would add only that this book was a pleasure to read as it provided, in an easy to read style, a wide and full account of the years preceding 1914. It richly details the politics and history of the European nations and their friendships, alliances, rivalries, economic power and weaknesses and military strengths and doctrines. This is done with much focus on the human aspect of the drivers for peace, empire, prestige and honour as one reads of the thoughts, messages, official memoranda and communications from central characters as well as others from all sides.
It is a long book, and when including sources, bibliography and index, at 700 pages it seems a challenge, but there is so much is within the twenty chapters that I thoroughly enjoyed it and didn't want it to come to an end - despite of course knowing the grim conclusion and events beyond.
I would recommend this to any student of the First World War, be they a general reader or one with much reading behind them.
Moreover, having read
July 1914: Countdown to War by Sean McMeekin, I would recommend this as a companion; it differs in conclusions and some focus areas but offers a compelling account, too. [My review: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...]
I must get around to reading
The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 by Christopher Clark, which is another highly recommended account published in 2014 like MacMillan's and McMeekin's for the WWI centenary.
There are over seven hundred reviews of this book on Goodreads so my adding a lengthy in-depth exposition will add little overall. Therefore, I would add only that this book was a pleasure to read as it provided, in an easy to read style, a wide and full account of the years preceding 1914. It richly details the politics and history of the European nations and their friendships, alliances, rivalries, economic power and weaknesses and military strengths and doctrines. This is done with much focus on the human aspect of the drivers for peace, empire, prestige and honour as one reads of the thoughts, messages, official memoranda and communications from central characters as well as others from all sides.
It is a long book, and when including sources, bibliography and index, at 700 pages it seems a challenge, but there is so much is within the twenty chapters that I thoroughly enjoyed it and didn't want it to come to an end - despite of course knowing the grim conclusion and events beyond.
I would recommend this to any student of the First World War, be they a general reader or one with much reading behind them.
Moreover, having read
July 1914: Countdown to War by Sean McMeekin, I would recommend this as a companion; it differs in conclusions and some focus areas but offers a compelling account, too. [My review: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...]I must get around to reading
The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 by Christopher Clark, which is another highly recommended account published in 2014 like MacMillan's and McMeekin's for the WWI centenary.
April 24, 2023
The Die is Cast.
One might think that another book on the origins of the First World War is not needed, the topic has been discussed, analysed and debated for over 100 years. Is there anything more to say? After all some of the greatest and most popular history books ever written are on the subject. The Sleepwalkers, Dreadnaught, July 1914 and The Guns of August are some that are world famous read by political leaders from John F Kennedy to Angela Merkel in order to teach them about diplomacy and foreign affairs. However, no one can agree on who is to blame for the cause of the war or what exactly happened after the fatal shots were fired on 28/06/2014 in Sarajevo. We do know that the war was one of the most devastating in history and one of the biggest events in human history, absolutely changing its course, human ideology and outlook.
With that in mind, I also suggest that one cannot read enough about this colossus and poignant event and it’s origins. There is always more to say, thinks to mention and perspectives to present. Margaret MacMillan’s book is one the best and is truest up there as a great book. I throughly enjoyed it and could not put it down until end. The style, the analysis, the pace are all fanatic. Extremely readable, exciting and not dumbed down in anyway. She has the masterful ability to present complex history at the right level, to be read by a wide audience and to be taken seriously by academic scholars. As a student of history from a red brick university myself, this is great.
One of the first questions MacMillan asks at the start of the book is, ‘who was the blame?’ This is probably the most important question, as the events of everything that has followed, propaganda and national actions have followed on from this point. The devastation, death and decline of society as a result have followed this point. MacMillan follows through this to tie it up at the end, that Germany probably more than other powers, as when the crisis unfolded in July 1914, they did the least to prevent war, or acted more in a way to facilitate a full European war. But MacMillan is a historian based on fact and reason, intelligent and well read. She clearly knows her subject and states that all involved, from the Kaiser, to Sir Edward Grey, Helmuth von Moltke, Theobald von Bethmann Holweg, Conrad von Hötzendorf and Raymond Poincaré and their respective governments all had involvement and ‘blame’. She casts the damning judgement, that none have the ability, courage or foresight to avert war. The European monarchs are the most guilty of this Tsar Nicholas II and Kaiser Wilhelm II both did not want war but were too weak to prevent it. Greater leaders such as Otto von Bismarck or JFK, in their hour of need would have resisted, as MacMillan writes.
That was the problem, the alliance systems, the Balkan crises, the balance of power, the naval race, nationalism, all played their part, but each were not enough to cause the war alone. But together, with the unfortunate events which stacked up, for example Petr Stolypin’s or even Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassinations prevented people who were against war from being there at the time of the crisis. Again these alone would not have prevented it. There were too many people involved to have an individual which such great impact, but as MacMillan shows the leaders were weak, or got their judgement wrong. As a result war came, but even then no one thought it would last beyond Christmas (this is a myth which MacMillan states was true).
MacMillan is masterful in painting a picture of society immediately before the war, what each country was going through, who was in power and what home and foreign affairs looked like. All of this is very important as each nation faced its own fears and difficulties. The Boar War, imperial tensions, women’s suffrage and home rule in Ireland dominated international and internal tensions in the United Kingdom for example, there was a huge amount of friction between it and France until the Entente Cordial was signed in 1904. Britain could have been isolated and could very nearly have slipped into civil war. As Macmillan shows with the Great War, civil war very nearly came and did actually erupt in Ireland anyway. The French with the Dreyfus Affair, radical government and further purge of a already weak and ill equipped army were some of its problems. Alongside all of this, theories of the day such as Social Darwinism and fears about the degeneration of society dominated middle and upper class thought and huge impacts when the key decisions had to be made.
The war did come, the diplomats amazingly wept and some even foresaw the end of their world as they knew it. But what is really great about this book is how each country faced the dilemmas and it is not so easy for them to have not faced war. Germany feared a war on two fronts (rightly in retrospect) so felt it have to act quickly to knock one out, Britain feared the loss of the balance of power and a new ‘Napoleonic’ domination of the continent, Russia felt is prestige and influence failing, Austria-Hungry also sensed its end of it did not act due to the rising nationalism in its fragile empire. Serbia was becoming to influential in the south. As I have said above this is an excellent book and should be read alongside the great books I’ve listed above. Start with it or taken it second or third, it doesn’t matter, just read it.
One might think that another book on the origins of the First World War is not needed, the topic has been discussed, analysed and debated for over 100 years. Is there anything more to say? After all some of the greatest and most popular history books ever written are on the subject. The Sleepwalkers, Dreadnaught, July 1914 and The Guns of August are some that are world famous read by political leaders from John F Kennedy to Angela Merkel in order to teach them about diplomacy and foreign affairs. However, no one can agree on who is to blame for the cause of the war or what exactly happened after the fatal shots were fired on 28/06/2014 in Sarajevo. We do know that the war was one of the most devastating in history and one of the biggest events in human history, absolutely changing its course, human ideology and outlook.
With that in mind, I also suggest that one cannot read enough about this colossus and poignant event and it’s origins. There is always more to say, thinks to mention and perspectives to present. Margaret MacMillan’s book is one the best and is truest up there as a great book. I throughly enjoyed it and could not put it down until end. The style, the analysis, the pace are all fanatic. Extremely readable, exciting and not dumbed down in anyway. She has the masterful ability to present complex history at the right level, to be read by a wide audience and to be taken seriously by academic scholars. As a student of history from a red brick university myself, this is great.
One of the first questions MacMillan asks at the start of the book is, ‘who was the blame?’ This is probably the most important question, as the events of everything that has followed, propaganda and national actions have followed on from this point. The devastation, death and decline of society as a result have followed this point. MacMillan follows through this to tie it up at the end, that Germany probably more than other powers, as when the crisis unfolded in July 1914, they did the least to prevent war, or acted more in a way to facilitate a full European war. But MacMillan is a historian based on fact and reason, intelligent and well read. She clearly knows her subject and states that all involved, from the Kaiser, to Sir Edward Grey, Helmuth von Moltke, Theobald von Bethmann Holweg, Conrad von Hötzendorf and Raymond Poincaré and their respective governments all had involvement and ‘blame’. She casts the damning judgement, that none have the ability, courage or foresight to avert war. The European monarchs are the most guilty of this Tsar Nicholas II and Kaiser Wilhelm II both did not want war but were too weak to prevent it. Greater leaders such as Otto von Bismarck or JFK, in their hour of need would have resisted, as MacMillan writes.
That was the problem, the alliance systems, the Balkan crises, the balance of power, the naval race, nationalism, all played their part, but each were not enough to cause the war alone. But together, with the unfortunate events which stacked up, for example Petr Stolypin’s or even Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassinations prevented people who were against war from being there at the time of the crisis. Again these alone would not have prevented it. There were too many people involved to have an individual which such great impact, but as MacMillan shows the leaders were weak, or got their judgement wrong. As a result war came, but even then no one thought it would last beyond Christmas (this is a myth which MacMillan states was true).
MacMillan is masterful in painting a picture of society immediately before the war, what each country was going through, who was in power and what home and foreign affairs looked like. All of this is very important as each nation faced its own fears and difficulties. The Boar War, imperial tensions, women’s suffrage and home rule in Ireland dominated international and internal tensions in the United Kingdom for example, there was a huge amount of friction between it and France until the Entente Cordial was signed in 1904. Britain could have been isolated and could very nearly have slipped into civil war. As Macmillan shows with the Great War, civil war very nearly came and did actually erupt in Ireland anyway. The French with the Dreyfus Affair, radical government and further purge of a already weak and ill equipped army were some of its problems. Alongside all of this, theories of the day such as Social Darwinism and fears about the degeneration of society dominated middle and upper class thought and huge impacts when the key decisions had to be made.
The war did come, the diplomats amazingly wept and some even foresaw the end of their world as they knew it. But what is really great about this book is how each country faced the dilemmas and it is not so easy for them to have not faced war. Germany feared a war on two fronts (rightly in retrospect) so felt it have to act quickly to knock one out, Britain feared the loss of the balance of power and a new ‘Napoleonic’ domination of the continent, Russia felt is prestige and influence failing, Austria-Hungry also sensed its end of it did not act due to the rising nationalism in its fragile empire. Serbia was becoming to influential in the south. As I have said above this is an excellent book and should be read alongside the great books I’ve listed above. Start with it or taken it second or third, it doesn’t matter, just read it.
March 24, 2014
In the days following July 24, 1914, every domino fell in just the right way so that war became the only possible outcome. Margaret MacMillan's great success is outlining how that all developed over the preceding years throughout Europe and the European nations' worldwide interests. As MacMillan states at the end of this brilliant work:
We must remember, as the decision-makers did, what had
happened before that last crisis of 1914 and what they had
learned from the Moroccan crises, the Bosnian one, or the
events of the First Balkan Wars. Europe's very success in
surviving those earlier crises paradoxically led to a
dangerous complacency in the summer of 1914 that, yet again,
solutions would be found at the last moment and peace would
be maintained.
But it wasn't. There were remaining feelings, slights, territorial disputes, desires to assert sovereignty and royal power. The scramble of messages between leaders and various state officials during that final two weeks was furious and educational. In 1914 Europe's leaders failed it either by deliberately opting for war or by not finding the strength to oppose it.
MacMillan provides a historical approach delving back into the 19th century for the roots of the relationships between the various European nations and territories as well as their relationships with colonies in Africa and elsewhere and other countries such as Japan and the United States. While this might sound unwieldy, it works very well. We see each country's developing sense of self (or lack); the growth of industry and it's effects; the wonderful Paris Exposition and it's reflection of the social, economic, political and artistic sense of the time; the advent and demise of various leaders who might have altered the future of Europe: the development of peace movements and workers' rights movements.
In her final comment, MacMillan states:
...if we want to point fingers from the twenty-first
century we can accuse those who took Europe into war of
two things. First, a failure of imagination in not seeing
how destructive such a conflict would be be and second,
their lack of courage to stand up to those who said there
was no choice left but to go to war. There are always
choices.
I highly recommend this book to anyone who would like to read a history on the background and beginning of World War One. MacMillan has provided an excellent, wide-ranging text that surpassed my expectations.
A very strong 5
A copy of this book was received from the publisher through NetGalley for the purpose of review.
We must remember, as the decision-makers did, what had
happened before that last crisis of 1914 and what they had
learned from the Moroccan crises, the Bosnian one, or the
events of the First Balkan Wars. Europe's very success in
surviving those earlier crises paradoxically led to a
dangerous complacency in the summer of 1914 that, yet again,
solutions would be found at the last moment and peace would
be maintained.
But it wasn't. There were remaining feelings, slights, territorial disputes, desires to assert sovereignty and royal power. The scramble of messages between leaders and various state officials during that final two weeks was furious and educational. In 1914 Europe's leaders failed it either by deliberately opting for war or by not finding the strength to oppose it.
MacMillan provides a historical approach delving back into the 19th century for the roots of the relationships between the various European nations and territories as well as their relationships with colonies in Africa and elsewhere and other countries such as Japan and the United States. While this might sound unwieldy, it works very well. We see each country's developing sense of self (or lack); the growth of industry and it's effects; the wonderful Paris Exposition and it's reflection of the social, economic, political and artistic sense of the time; the advent and demise of various leaders who might have altered the future of Europe: the development of peace movements and workers' rights movements.
In her final comment, MacMillan states:
...if we want to point fingers from the twenty-first
century we can accuse those who took Europe into war of
two things. First, a failure of imagination in not seeing
how destructive such a conflict would be be and second,
their lack of courage to stand up to those who said there
was no choice left but to go to war. There are always
choices.
I highly recommend this book to anyone who would like to read a history on the background and beginning of World War One. MacMillan has provided an excellent, wide-ranging text that surpassed my expectations.
A very strong 5
A copy of this book was received from the publisher through NetGalley for the purpose of review.
April 25, 2018
I found this volume to be an excellent look at the 25 yrs or so leading up to the Great War and how Europe drifted into war. Professor MacMillan looks at each of the five main powers in Europe and how events and the personalities of the major people in those countries affected the steps that lead to war.
As the author looks at each of the major powers in Europe, she traces the developments that led the alliances and from there to war. She looks the pressures each country was under and how they affected the choices their respective leaders made. In looking at these pressures, the author details how both technological advances, national pride and the attendant rivalries with the other major powers, as well internal politics caused the various leaders to make decisions that came back to haunt them in the summer of 1914.
Prof MacMillan gives a good overview of the various diplomatic crisi that occurred between 1890 in Africa and the Balkan States and the assassination of the Austrian heir in June of 1914, many of which came close to causing a general war, that gave rise to the feeling in Europe’s capitals that somehow we will muddle through without a general war breaking out.
She also gives good sketches of the various countries leaders. I think the best sketch is her portrayal of the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II. From his dismissal of the great Bismarck to the outbreak of war, he seems to be the proverbial bull in a china shop. His meddling in foreign affairs and insistence on building an ocean going navy to rival Britain drove Britain to settle her differences with France and if not an outright alliance, a very close working military relationship between the two countries. She compares him to Mr. Toad when he gets a motor car in the children’s classic “Wind in the Willows”. Toad thinks he knows how to drive, but is completely clueless and no one can tell him anything. Wilhelm thinks he is consumate diplomat, and nobody is willing to tell him otherwise.
The author’s discussion of the development of the military plans and their inflexibility is also very well done. As the rivalries and alliances became more entrenched the dependence on the General Staff’s mobilization plans and the various army’s independence from their gov’ts control drove the march to war. Prof MacMillan’s telling of the armies and navies rivalries and their failure conduct joint planning is eye opening.
The only problem I had with it is nitpicking at best. When discussing the naval arms race, the author sometimes gets confused on terminology and ship classes. This doesn’t detract from here excellent analysis however.
Is summary the author has given the readers a superb look at how by 1914, Europe blundered into a war that nobody really wanted and nobody could stop. 4.25 stars rounded down to 4 for Goodreads.
As the author looks at each of the major powers in Europe, she traces the developments that led the alliances and from there to war. She looks the pressures each country was under and how they affected the choices their respective leaders made. In looking at these pressures, the author details how both technological advances, national pride and the attendant rivalries with the other major powers, as well internal politics caused the various leaders to make decisions that came back to haunt them in the summer of 1914.
Prof MacMillan gives a good overview of the various diplomatic crisi that occurred between 1890 in Africa and the Balkan States and the assassination of the Austrian heir in June of 1914, many of which came close to causing a general war, that gave rise to the feeling in Europe’s capitals that somehow we will muddle through without a general war breaking out.
She also gives good sketches of the various countries leaders. I think the best sketch is her portrayal of the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II. From his dismissal of the great Bismarck to the outbreak of war, he seems to be the proverbial bull in a china shop. His meddling in foreign affairs and insistence on building an ocean going navy to rival Britain drove Britain to settle her differences with France and if not an outright alliance, a very close working military relationship between the two countries. She compares him to Mr. Toad when he gets a motor car in the children’s classic “Wind in the Willows”. Toad thinks he knows how to drive, but is completely clueless and no one can tell him anything. Wilhelm thinks he is consumate diplomat, and nobody is willing to tell him otherwise.
The author’s discussion of the development of the military plans and their inflexibility is also very well done. As the rivalries and alliances became more entrenched the dependence on the General Staff’s mobilization plans and the various army’s independence from their gov’ts control drove the march to war. Prof MacMillan’s telling of the armies and navies rivalries and their failure conduct joint planning is eye opening.
The only problem I had with it is nitpicking at best. When discussing the naval arms race, the author sometimes gets confused on terminology and ship classes. This doesn’t detract from here excellent analysis however.
Is summary the author has given the readers a superb look at how by 1914, Europe blundered into a war that nobody really wanted and nobody could stop. 4.25 stars rounded down to 4 for Goodreads.
April 18, 2018
Very good and recommended to the beginner. Readers be aware though. It is long and can be complex. With that in mind the author is to be congratulated for making the complexity of the subject such an easy read. A book of it times as the comparisons to recent events in history books I tend to judge harshly but they tend to work in this case.
December 16, 2020
“History doesn’t repeat itself, but human nature remains the same.”
― Ken Burns
In this sense, history always has something to teach us.
For starters, social darwinism was the ideology behind the foolish thirst for war, as covered in this other book.
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-x...
=====
“Woe to the Country That Has a Child for King!” (Ecclesiastes 10:16)
The author, a British historian, begins with the UK perspective. But the big character of this book is Kaiser Wilhelm II, a very Trump-like personality. The difference is that he focused his aggression outward, resulting in a disastrous war. But like Trump, he did what he wanted without the consent of the people.
https://blog.oup.com/2017/10/american...
Some quotes from the book....
It was Europe’s and the world’s tragedy in retrospect that none of the key players in 1914 were great and imaginative leaders who had the courage to stand out against the pressures building up for war.
The established power is too often arrogant, lecturing the rest of the world about how to manage its affairs, and too often insensitive to the fears and concerns of lesser powers. Such a power, as Britain was then, and the United States is today, inevitably resists its own intimations of mortality and the rising one is impatient to get its fair share of whatever is on offer, whether colonies, trade, resources or influence.
“We learnt,” said a distinguished British soldier, “to believe the English were the salt of the earth and England the first and greatest country in the world. Our confidence in her powers and our utter disbelief in the possibility of any earthly Power vanquishing her, became a fixed idea which nothing could eradicate and no gloom dispel.”
Tirpitz made three crucial assumptions: that the British would not notice that Germany was developing a big navy; that Britain would not and could not respond by outbuilding Germany (among other things, Tirpitz assumed that the British could not afford a big increase in their naval budget); and that, while being pressured into making friends with Germany, Britain would not decide to look for friends elsewhere. He was wrong about all three.
The naval race between Germany and Britain helped to lead Europe towards the Great War. Germany’s decision to challenge British naval supremacy caused the British to respond both by increased naval spending and by mending fences with Britain’s old antagonists France.
Franz Ferdinand spoke for many Austrian conservatives, blamed the Jews for the end of the old hierarchical society which had been based on sound Christian principles. In both the Austrian and German officer corps the mood seems to have been one of pessimism about the future of their way of life. That may well have affected the willingness of the leading generals to go to war in 1914. As the Prussian Minister of War, General Erich von Falkenhayn, said on August 4 as the war became a general one: “Even if we will perish, it was nice.”
In the years before 1914 the eugenics movement, advocating the breeding and cultivation of human beings as if they were cattle or vegetables, also found considerable support among political and intellectual elites.
In Vienna, the rising politician Karl Lueger discovered that he could mobilize the lower classes by appealing to their fears of change and capitalism, their resentment of the prosperous middle classes, and their hatred of Jews. His abilities as a political organizer impressed the young Adolf Hitler who had moved to Vienna in 1907.
The sort of war which they mostly envisaged, though, was one that was increasingly anachronistic as the nineteenth century wore on. The European military looked back to the great soldiers of the past for inspiration: Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and, closer in time, such figures as Frederick the Great or Napoleon. And the modern-day soldiers longed to emulate the great attacks of the past with their infantry assaults, their hand-to-hand fighting and their cavalry charges. Death in battle was “life’s ultimate reward”
In Germany, it has been estimated, most of the novels written for adolescents before the Great War dealt with the nation’s great military past, from the defeat of a Roman army by Germanic tribes to the wars of unification.
Like losing gamblers who saw no way out except to put everything on a throw of the dice or a spin of the roulette wheel, too many of Europe’s military planners, like the Germans, suppressed their own doubts and put their faith in a short decisive war.
The warnings of experts such as Ivan Bloch and Moltke himself or of pacifists such as Bertha von Suttner and Jean Jaurès that offensives would end in stalemates with neither side strong enough to overcome the other, while societies were drained of their resources, from men to munitions, were forgotten, at least for the time being, as the European powers marched into war.
In 1916 alone Russia’s summer offensive produced 1.4 million casualties; 400,000 Italians were taken prisoner in Conrad’s offensive in the Dolomites against Italy; and there were 57,000 British casualties on July 1, the first day of the Somme, and by the battle’s end in November 650,000 Allied dead, wounded or missing along with 400,000 Germans.
By the time the war ended on November 11, 1918, sixty-five million men had fought and eight and a half million had been killed. Eight million were prisoners or simply missing. Twenty-one million had been wounded.
As Germany’s armies met defeat in the summer of 1918, the German public, which had been kept in the dark by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who now dominated the civilian government, reacted angrily against the whole endeavor.
The nationalist passions which sustained Europeans during the war had also led to the wanton killing of civilians, whether by Germans in Belgium, the Russians in Galicia or the Austrians in Bosnia. Occupying armies had rounded up civilians for forced labor and driven out those of the “wrong” ethnicity. After the war, in much of Europe politics were marked by violence, with frequent assassinations and pitched battles between opposing parties.
Why did this war happen?
First, a failure of imagination in not seeing how destructive such a conflict would be and second, their lack of courage to stand up to those who said there was no choice left but to go to war.
― Ken Burns
In this sense, history always has something to teach us.
For starters, social darwinism was the ideology behind the foolish thirst for war, as covered in this other book.
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-x...
=====
“Woe to the Country That Has a Child for King!” (Ecclesiastes 10:16)
The author, a British historian, begins with the UK perspective. But the big character of this book is Kaiser Wilhelm II, a very Trump-like personality. The difference is that he focused his aggression outward, resulting in a disastrous war. But like Trump, he did what he wanted without the consent of the people.
https://blog.oup.com/2017/10/american...
Some quotes from the book....
It was Europe’s and the world’s tragedy in retrospect that none of the key players in 1914 were great and imaginative leaders who had the courage to stand out against the pressures building up for war.
The established power is too often arrogant, lecturing the rest of the world about how to manage its affairs, and too often insensitive to the fears and concerns of lesser powers. Such a power, as Britain was then, and the United States is today, inevitably resists its own intimations of mortality and the rising one is impatient to get its fair share of whatever is on offer, whether colonies, trade, resources or influence.
“We learnt,” said a distinguished British soldier, “to believe the English were the salt of the earth and England the first and greatest country in the world. Our confidence in her powers and our utter disbelief in the possibility of any earthly Power vanquishing her, became a fixed idea which nothing could eradicate and no gloom dispel.”
Tirpitz made three crucial assumptions: that the British would not notice that Germany was developing a big navy; that Britain would not and could not respond by outbuilding Germany (among other things, Tirpitz assumed that the British could not afford a big increase in their naval budget); and that, while being pressured into making friends with Germany, Britain would not decide to look for friends elsewhere. He was wrong about all three.
The naval race between Germany and Britain helped to lead Europe towards the Great War. Germany’s decision to challenge British naval supremacy caused the British to respond both by increased naval spending and by mending fences with Britain’s old antagonists France.
Franz Ferdinand spoke for many Austrian conservatives, blamed the Jews for the end of the old hierarchical society which had been based on sound Christian principles. In both the Austrian and German officer corps the mood seems to have been one of pessimism about the future of their way of life. That may well have affected the willingness of the leading generals to go to war in 1914. As the Prussian Minister of War, General Erich von Falkenhayn, said on August 4 as the war became a general one: “Even if we will perish, it was nice.”
In the years before 1914 the eugenics movement, advocating the breeding and cultivation of human beings as if they were cattle or vegetables, also found considerable support among political and intellectual elites.
In Vienna, the rising politician Karl Lueger discovered that he could mobilize the lower classes by appealing to their fears of change and capitalism, their resentment of the prosperous middle classes, and their hatred of Jews. His abilities as a political organizer impressed the young Adolf Hitler who had moved to Vienna in 1907.
The sort of war which they mostly envisaged, though, was one that was increasingly anachronistic as the nineteenth century wore on. The European military looked back to the great soldiers of the past for inspiration: Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and, closer in time, such figures as Frederick the Great or Napoleon. And the modern-day soldiers longed to emulate the great attacks of the past with their infantry assaults, their hand-to-hand fighting and their cavalry charges. Death in battle was “life’s ultimate reward”
In Germany, it has been estimated, most of the novels written for adolescents before the Great War dealt with the nation’s great military past, from the defeat of a Roman army by Germanic tribes to the wars of unification.
Like losing gamblers who saw no way out except to put everything on a throw of the dice or a spin of the roulette wheel, too many of Europe’s military planners, like the Germans, suppressed their own doubts and put their faith in a short decisive war.
The warnings of experts such as Ivan Bloch and Moltke himself or of pacifists such as Bertha von Suttner and Jean Jaurès that offensives would end in stalemates with neither side strong enough to overcome the other, while societies were drained of their resources, from men to munitions, were forgotten, at least for the time being, as the European powers marched into war.
In 1916 alone Russia’s summer offensive produced 1.4 million casualties; 400,000 Italians were taken prisoner in Conrad’s offensive in the Dolomites against Italy; and there were 57,000 British casualties on July 1, the first day of the Somme, and by the battle’s end in November 650,000 Allied dead, wounded or missing along with 400,000 Germans.
By the time the war ended on November 11, 1918, sixty-five million men had fought and eight and a half million had been killed. Eight million were prisoners or simply missing. Twenty-one million had been wounded.
As Germany’s armies met defeat in the summer of 1918, the German public, which had been kept in the dark by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who now dominated the civilian government, reacted angrily against the whole endeavor.
The nationalist passions which sustained Europeans during the war had also led to the wanton killing of civilians, whether by Germans in Belgium, the Russians in Galicia or the Austrians in Bosnia. Occupying armies had rounded up civilians for forced labor and driven out those of the “wrong” ethnicity. After the war, in much of Europe politics were marked by violence, with frequent assassinations and pitched battles between opposing parties.
Why did this war happen?
First, a failure of imagination in not seeing how destructive such a conflict would be and second, their lack of courage to stand up to those who said there was no choice left but to go to war.
February 4, 2019
The War That Ended Peace, written by Margaret MacMillan and published in 2013, is one of several recent history books exploring the causes of World War I. Impeccably researched, this seven hundred page tome of twenty-two chapters also includes an exhaustive bibliography and a well-placed set of supporting photographs. It is almost exclusively focused on the European powers so is not as world inclusive as some of the other scholarship on pre WWI. Given that there are few wasted words in this lengthy book, it was a wise decision to limit the discussions to those European powers. There is a fair amount of history on the ruling European monarchs, most of whom were related to one another. The monarchs were largely responsible for the decisions to go to war. The history around the monarchs of this period still fascinates me.
King George V
Kaiser Wilhelm II
Tsar Nicolas II
Tsarina Alexandra
The Cousins. Nicholas II is a cousin of King George V through their grandfather Christian IX. King George V and Wilhelm and Alexandra are 1st cousins through their grandmother Victoria. The visual resemblance between George and Nicholas is remarkable.
The War That Ended Peace is a long read but there are a series of four chapters in the middle of the book that I found especially captivating, the subject matter being highly original.
Chapter 7 - The Bear and the Whale
The ‘Bear’ is Russia and the ‘Whale’ because of its navy is Britain in this story. The phrase was coined by Friedrich von Holstein, a German foreign policy expert, as Germany tried unsuccessfully for decades to drive a wedge between Russia and Britain. Focus is heavily on Tsar Nicholas and Russia prior to the war. We also learn about Russia’s failure in the Russo-Japanese War, the destruction of its navy and read of the ‘first’ Russian Revolution of 1905 that was a prelude to 1917. The Tsar became isolated and while he is said to have loved his country, the introvert in him had lost touch with the commoner. By the end of the chapter we learn that Nicholas, distrustful of his distant cousin Kaiser Wilhelm, wisely enters into an Entente with Britain and France. A good deal of coverage of the Tsarina Alexandra. Five stars.
Chapter 8 - The Loyalty of the Nibelungs
A Nibelung is a Germanic term for the loyal royals from the middle ages. Getting beyond the obscure title, this chapter is supposed to be about the alliance of Austria-Hungary and “loyal” Germany but is really more about Franz Joseph and Franz Ferdinand and to a smaller degree the relationship between Austria and Hungary and the dual-monarchy. We learn of the dutiful and aging Emperor Franz Joseph and the tragedies in his long reign of nearly sixty years. First his brother Maximilian, who assumed a newly defined monarchy in Mexico after a truly strange scenario when Mexico defaulted on their loans, is executed three years later in Mexico City. Then his son, and heir to the throne Rudolph, perpetrated a murder-suicide on his illicit teenage lover. Next Franz Joseph’s wife, the charming Empress Elisabeth from Munich, is assassinated while visiting Geneva. Next Franz Joseph’s brother, and heir to the throne, dies of diphtheria leaving his son Franz Ferdinand next in line until he is famously assassinated in Sarajevo . Interesting coverage of Franz Ferdinand’s influence in Hungary. Five stars.
Chapter 9 - What Were They Thinking? Hopes, Fears, Ideas, and Unspoken Assumptions
Something very great, the old, cosmopolitan, still predominantly agrarian and feudal Europe, the world of beautiful women, gallant kings, and dynastic combinations, the Europe of the eighteenth century and the Holy Alliance was growing old and weak, dying out; and something new, young, energetic, and still unimaginable was in the offing. We felt it like a frost, like a spring in our limbs, the one with muffled pain, the other with a keen joy.
This is the oddest chapter in the book but still very good. It is the chapter that highlights the transition from the old world of the 19th century with the underlying reasons for the discontent that caused the war. There is a section on how prevalent duels still were, only outlawed in Britain. A section on Nietzsche who died in 1900. Sections on mysticism, eugenics, women’s rights, social Darwinism. All these factors played a part in the rise of anarchists and communism. There is also a heavy focus on France as a declining power, economically and militarily, and the anxiety on the part of the French leaders that the Germans, especially Kaiser Wilhelm, looked to exploit. Five stars.
Chapter 10 - Dreaming of Peace
Perhaps the chapter where I learned the most. We read about Bertha von Suttner, an Austrian, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1905 for her writing and founding the Austrian Peace Society. We also learn that Jean de Bloch, Russia’s Andrew Carnegie, founded the International Museum of War and Peace in 1902 and lobbied the European leaders to maintain peace because war was economically irrational and there would be no winners. He was prescient. MacMillan writes that the strongest and most influential peace movement before 1914 was in the United States, followed closely by Britain and France. Of course Woodrow Wilson, of the world leaders, was the most vocal advocate for peace. In France, Jean Jaures, a leading socialist, was a peace advocate but was assassinated by a nationalist right before the events of Sarajevo. There is also discussion of the rise of communism as it pertains to anti-war rhetoric. Five stars.
MacMillan, a masterful historian, displays her gift for bite size story telling. She is particularly good when writing about the petulant monarchs. To buttress the narrative MacMillan extracts fascinating quotes, an ability that she shares with other top historians. As mentioned the middle chapters of the book are quite good as is the final chapter “Turning Out the Lights”. The material in some of the chapters, however, is not as exceptional or is covered better in other books.
Four Stars overall.
King George V Kaiser Wilhelm II Tsar Nicolas II Tsarina AlexandraThe Cousins. Nicholas II is a cousin of King George V through their grandfather Christian IX. King George V and Wilhelm and Alexandra are 1st cousins through their grandmother Victoria. The visual resemblance between George and Nicholas is remarkable.
The War That Ended Peace is a long read but there are a series of four chapters in the middle of the book that I found especially captivating, the subject matter being highly original.
Chapter 7 - The Bear and the Whale
The ‘Bear’ is Russia and the ‘Whale’ because of its navy is Britain in this story. The phrase was coined by Friedrich von Holstein, a German foreign policy expert, as Germany tried unsuccessfully for decades to drive a wedge between Russia and Britain. Focus is heavily on Tsar Nicholas and Russia prior to the war. We also learn about Russia’s failure in the Russo-Japanese War, the destruction of its navy and read of the ‘first’ Russian Revolution of 1905 that was a prelude to 1917. The Tsar became isolated and while he is said to have loved his country, the introvert in him had lost touch with the commoner. By the end of the chapter we learn that Nicholas, distrustful of his distant cousin Kaiser Wilhelm, wisely enters into an Entente with Britain and France. A good deal of coverage of the Tsarina Alexandra. Five stars.
Chapter 8 - The Loyalty of the Nibelungs
A Nibelung is a Germanic term for the loyal royals from the middle ages. Getting beyond the obscure title, this chapter is supposed to be about the alliance of Austria-Hungary and “loyal” Germany but is really more about Franz Joseph and Franz Ferdinand and to a smaller degree the relationship between Austria and Hungary and the dual-monarchy. We learn of the dutiful and aging Emperor Franz Joseph and the tragedies in his long reign of nearly sixty years. First his brother Maximilian, who assumed a newly defined monarchy in Mexico after a truly strange scenario when Mexico defaulted on their loans, is executed three years later in Mexico City. Then his son, and heir to the throne Rudolph, perpetrated a murder-suicide on his illicit teenage lover. Next Franz Joseph’s wife, the charming Empress Elisabeth from Munich, is assassinated while visiting Geneva. Next Franz Joseph’s brother, and heir to the throne, dies of diphtheria leaving his son Franz Ferdinand next in line until he is famously assassinated in Sarajevo . Interesting coverage of Franz Ferdinand’s influence in Hungary. Five stars.
Chapter 9 - What Were They Thinking? Hopes, Fears, Ideas, and Unspoken Assumptions
Something very great, the old, cosmopolitan, still predominantly agrarian and feudal Europe, the world of beautiful women, gallant kings, and dynastic combinations, the Europe of the eighteenth century and the Holy Alliance was growing old and weak, dying out; and something new, young, energetic, and still unimaginable was in the offing. We felt it like a frost, like a spring in our limbs, the one with muffled pain, the other with a keen joy.
This is the oddest chapter in the book but still very good. It is the chapter that highlights the transition from the old world of the 19th century with the underlying reasons for the discontent that caused the war. There is a section on how prevalent duels still were, only outlawed in Britain. A section on Nietzsche who died in 1900. Sections on mysticism, eugenics, women’s rights, social Darwinism. All these factors played a part in the rise of anarchists and communism. There is also a heavy focus on France as a declining power, economically and militarily, and the anxiety on the part of the French leaders that the Germans, especially Kaiser Wilhelm, looked to exploit. Five stars.
Chapter 10 - Dreaming of Peace
Perhaps the chapter where I learned the most. We read about Bertha von Suttner, an Austrian, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1905 for her writing and founding the Austrian Peace Society. We also learn that Jean de Bloch, Russia’s Andrew Carnegie, founded the International Museum of War and Peace in 1902 and lobbied the European leaders to maintain peace because war was economically irrational and there would be no winners. He was prescient. MacMillan writes that the strongest and most influential peace movement before 1914 was in the United States, followed closely by Britain and France. Of course Woodrow Wilson, of the world leaders, was the most vocal advocate for peace. In France, Jean Jaures, a leading socialist, was a peace advocate but was assassinated by a nationalist right before the events of Sarajevo. There is also discussion of the rise of communism as it pertains to anti-war rhetoric. Five stars.
MacMillan, a masterful historian, displays her gift for bite size story telling. She is particularly good when writing about the petulant monarchs. To buttress the narrative MacMillan extracts fascinating quotes, an ability that she shares with other top historians. As mentioned the middle chapters of the book are quite good as is the final chapter “Turning Out the Lights”. The material in some of the chapters, however, is not as exceptional or is covered better in other books.
Four Stars overall.
July 28, 2016
This book describes the complex mosaic of history, politics, personalities, relationships, institutions, and ideas that developed and interacted with each other through the 19th century and into the 20th century that then lead to a set of circumstances in Europe that caused the nation’s leaders to see no alternative to war. Thus World War began 100 years ago in 1914.
The book contains parallel histories of the various European countries and tries to provide an understanding of those individuals who had to make the choices between war and peace. Their strengths and weaknesses, their loves, hatreds and biases are all explored. The book describes the world they lived in and its assumptions including what people of the time had learned from previous crises.
Ironically, the long stretch of 100 years between the Napoleonic Wars to WWI of relative peace (Franco-Prussian War, Austro-Prussian War, 1st and 2nd Balkan Wars were all over within a couple months) and the fact the previous conflicts had been resolved through negotiations led to a complacent assumption that the next conflict would be solved without war. Hidden under this complacency were dissatisfactions regarding the compromises that had come from the negotiations that had settled previous crises.
KAISER WILHELM'S PERSONALITY
Kaiser Wilhelm II was not a pleasant person to be around. He was loud, impulsive and had a juvenile sense of humor. He selected his advisers and top government positions, and I believe they reflected his personality. I believe this partly explains why German foreign policies tended to be aggressive and confrontational.
COLONIAL FEVER
All the European countries at the time seemed to think that the rest of the world was made for them to colonize. Since Germany was late to form as a united country they felt like they hadn't gotten their share. This also contributed to German aggressiveness in foreign affairs.
KIEL CANAL
It is no coincidence that the war began in the same year that work on widening the Kiel Canal was finished. The widening of the canal allowed the passage of Dreadnought-sized battleships to travel from the Baltic Sea to the North Sea without having to go around Denmark. Prior to completion of the project Germany had the mind set that they weren't ready for war. Thus the completion in 1914 may have contributed to Germany giving Austria-Hungary the green light in their confrontation with Serbia. In earlier confrontations (i.e. First and Second Balkan Wars) Germany had encouraged Austria-Hungary to compromise.
GERMAN WAR PLAN COULDN'T BE CHANGED
Early in the mobilization Kaiser Wilhelm asked if Germany could mobilize for war against Russia only and not toward France. He was told by General Moltke that the Schlieffen Plan called for mobilization against both Russia and France and it couldn't be changed. He said mobilization against only Russia would cause widespread chaos. He was probably correct.
OFFENSE NO MATCH FOR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS
All the military schools prior to the war seemed to have stressed the doctrine of the offensive in the execution of war. It's ironic that the early 20th century is the one time in history when defensive weapons were relative superior to the offensive tools of war. Machine guns and repeating rifles were effective when used in defense of fixed positions whereas offensive weapons such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, trucks, and attack airplanes were in their infancy. Industrialization had developed the railroads which enabled quick mobilization soldiers. But once they were near the front they needed to use their legs. The result was a defensive war where the trenches hardly moved during its four year duration.
This book does a good job of describing a time in history which is not widely understood today. This year we're observing the centennial of the war's beginning, so it deserves to be understood a little better. The following is what the book has to say about the cause of the war.
Here's a link to an excerpt:
http://delanceyplace.com/view-archive...
The following short review of this book is from the PageADay Book Lover's Calendar for July 28, 2016:
Today's date marks the beginning of World War I in 1914, and this award-winning author offers a masterful explanation of its causes. After the end of the Napoleonic wars, most residents of Europe believed that the future would be peaceful. However, complex personalities, bitter rivalries, and shifting allegiances brought about a new war that was bigger than anything before. The book provides insightful portraits of the major players, including Tsar Nicholas II, King Edward VII, Alfred Nobel, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and a young Winston Churchill. In elegantly written prose, we are shown how the decisions of a few powerful people changed the course of history.
THE WAR THAT ENDED PEACE: THE ROAD TO 1914, by Margaret MacMillan (Random House, 2013)
The book contains parallel histories of the various European countries and tries to provide an understanding of those individuals who had to make the choices between war and peace. Their strengths and weaknesses, their loves, hatreds and biases are all explored. The book describes the world they lived in and its assumptions including what people of the time had learned from previous crises.
Ironically, the long stretch of 100 years between the Napoleonic Wars to WWI of relative peace (Franco-Prussian War, Austro-Prussian War, 1st and 2nd Balkan Wars were all over within a couple months) and the fact the previous conflicts had been resolved through negotiations led to a complacent assumption that the next conflict would be solved without war. Hidden under this complacency were dissatisfactions regarding the compromises that had come from the negotiations that had settled previous crises.
"What was dangerous for the future was that each of Austria-Hungary and Russia was left thinking that threats might work again. Or, and this was equally dangerous, they decided that next time they would not back down." (p.499)Thus when the assassination in Sarajevo occurred and Austria made impossible demands of Serbia in retaliation, nobody was inclined to back down. The multiple alliances that had developed over the years complicated matters.
"By 1914 the alliances, rather than acting as brakes on their members, were too often pushing the accelerators. (p. 531)"The following are some of my observations about the history described by this book:
KAISER WILHELM'S PERSONALITY
Kaiser Wilhelm II was not a pleasant person to be around. He was loud, impulsive and had a juvenile sense of humor. He selected his advisers and top government positions, and I believe they reflected his personality. I believe this partly explains why German foreign policies tended to be aggressive and confrontational.
COLONIAL FEVER
All the European countries at the time seemed to think that the rest of the world was made for them to colonize. Since Germany was late to form as a united country they felt like they hadn't gotten their share. This also contributed to German aggressiveness in foreign affairs.
KIEL CANAL
It is no coincidence that the war began in the same year that work on widening the Kiel Canal was finished. The widening of the canal allowed the passage of Dreadnought-sized battleships to travel from the Baltic Sea to the North Sea without having to go around Denmark. Prior to completion of the project Germany had the mind set that they weren't ready for war. Thus the completion in 1914 may have contributed to Germany giving Austria-Hungary the green light in their confrontation with Serbia. In earlier confrontations (i.e. First and Second Balkan Wars) Germany had encouraged Austria-Hungary to compromise.
GERMAN WAR PLAN COULDN'T BE CHANGED
Early in the mobilization Kaiser Wilhelm asked if Germany could mobilize for war against Russia only and not toward France. He was told by General Moltke that the Schlieffen Plan called for mobilization against both Russia and France and it couldn't be changed. He said mobilization against only Russia would cause widespread chaos. He was probably correct.
OFFENSE NO MATCH FOR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS
All the military schools prior to the war seemed to have stressed the doctrine of the offensive in the execution of war. It's ironic that the early 20th century is the one time in history when defensive weapons were relative superior to the offensive tools of war. Machine guns and repeating rifles were effective when used in defense of fixed positions whereas offensive weapons such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, trucks, and attack airplanes were in their infancy. Industrialization had developed the railroads which enabled quick mobilization soldiers. But once they were near the front they needed to use their legs. The result was a defensive war where the trenches hardly moved during its four year duration.
This book does a good job of describing a time in history which is not widely understood today. This year we're observing the centennial of the war's beginning, so it deserves to be understood a little better. The following is what the book has to say about the cause of the war.
"The Great War was not produced by a single cause but by a combination and, in the end, human decisions."In other words, it's complicated. This is a long book (32 hours in audio format) and once again shows that the more one learns about history the less clear cut become the reasons for directions taken.
Here's a link to an excerpt:
http://delanceyplace.com/view-archive...
The following short review of this book is from the PageADay Book Lover's Calendar for July 28, 2016:
Today's date marks the beginning of World War I in 1914, and this award-winning author offers a masterful explanation of its causes. After the end of the Napoleonic wars, most residents of Europe believed that the future would be peaceful. However, complex personalities, bitter rivalries, and shifting allegiances brought about a new war that was bigger than anything before. The book provides insightful portraits of the major players, including Tsar Nicholas II, King Edward VII, Alfred Nobel, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and a young Winston Churchill. In elegantly written prose, we are shown how the decisions of a few powerful people changed the course of history.
THE WAR THAT ENDED PEACE: THE ROAD TO 1914, by Margaret MacMillan (Random House, 2013)
June 28, 2018
The bibliography of the origins of WWI, much like its subject, is vast beyond comprehension. Therefor I was not expecting much of the centenial literary avalanche. Margaret MacMillan was a forerunner and felt overhyped, in spite of her laudable credentials*. I'm pleasantly surprised to see the book live up to the fanfare.
The story in itself is familiar, with the Anglo-German race as its starting point. It's spiced up with the usual array of anecdotes pulled from memoirs & diaries, some often used before and some less so. Episodes such as the Bosnian crisis of 1908 however, get more coverage than is usual, providing an even depth. Where MacMillan shines, in the vein of Christopher Clark**, is in the atmosphere. Throughout she preserves a sense of evitability. The decision makers on each side routinely view their own actions and alliances as defensive and, tough conscious of the rewards to reap after victory, project an aggresive anxiety upon their opponent. It stops the text from leading the reader in clear lineair fashion from crisis to crisis down to the outbreak of hostilities in july 1914. At one point 1914 is considered by contemporaries to be the most quiet year in a while, following a rapid series of almost Pan-European wars.
Which brings me to the fatalism that counterbalances in curious fashion the Realpolitik, paranoia & relief that pervade the decades before the world crisis. Hopefully the next crisis could be avoided; if not, it's best to get things over with. The exact mix of emotions was tied to the respective declining or improving military upper hand of each nation, but all chose the same outcome in the end. Whether sleepwalking or running off a cliff.
*
Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War
**
The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 by Christopher Clark
The story in itself is familiar, with the Anglo-German race as its starting point. It's spiced up with the usual array of anecdotes pulled from memoirs & diaries, some often used before and some less so. Episodes such as the Bosnian crisis of 1908 however, get more coverage than is usual, providing an even depth. Where MacMillan shines, in the vein of Christopher Clark**, is in the atmosphere. Throughout she preserves a sense of evitability. The decision makers on each side routinely view their own actions and alliances as defensive and, tough conscious of the rewards to reap after victory, project an aggresive anxiety upon their opponent. It stops the text from leading the reader in clear lineair fashion from crisis to crisis down to the outbreak of hostilities in july 1914. At one point 1914 is considered by contemporaries to be the most quiet year in a while, following a rapid series of almost Pan-European wars.
Which brings me to the fatalism that counterbalances in curious fashion the Realpolitik, paranoia & relief that pervade the decades before the world crisis. Hopefully the next crisis could be avoided; if not, it's best to get things over with. The exact mix of emotions was tied to the respective declining or improving military upper hand of each nation, but all chose the same outcome in the end. Whether sleepwalking or running off a cliff.
*
Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War **
The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 by Christopher Clark
May 29, 2020
Margaret MacMillan’s book examines the first fourteen years of the 20th century and finishes with the German invasion of Belgium. What makes “The War that Ended Peace” different is the author’s approach.
It is easy to pronounce the Great War inevitable due to the complex set of reasons that started it. However, MacMillan argues that none of the individuals, of the key leaders that had the power to say “yes” or “no” were great or imaginative enough to avoid conflict. Briefly and with a glimpse of humor, Margaret MacMillan describes figures – well-known or obscure – who made the crucial decisions. She also effectively distributes the responsibility among all the participants.
In her work, Margaret MacMilan evokes a great general picture of the situation. She describes the trade wars, the imperialism with its striving for colonies, and the alliance systems dividing Europe into unfriendly camps as well as the economic rivalry and the arms race among the Great Powers.
MacMillan makes a remarkable analysis of the years prior to the war, attributing the conflict to the many ideas developing during the period (Social Darwinism, which ranked human societies as if they were species, nationalism, hopes for a better world, etc.) and to the role of individual nations. She provides an insight into the ambitions of rising Germany and Japan, the French and Russian revenge, and the fears of declining England and barely surviving Austria-Hungary.
MacMillan looks into the pressures that influenced the policy of each of the countries. Examining the diplomatic crisis on the Balkans, she gives a good explanation for the Serbian and Austrian inability to resolve their conflict peacefully.
“The War that Ended Peace” is a remarkably enjoyable and helpful book to help you unravel at least partially the tangled causes of “The War To End All Wars”.
It is easy to pronounce the Great War inevitable due to the complex set of reasons that started it. However, MacMillan argues that none of the individuals, of the key leaders that had the power to say “yes” or “no” were great or imaginative enough to avoid conflict. Briefly and with a glimpse of humor, Margaret MacMillan describes figures – well-known or obscure – who made the crucial decisions. She also effectively distributes the responsibility among all the participants.
In her work, Margaret MacMilan evokes a great general picture of the situation. She describes the trade wars, the imperialism with its striving for colonies, and the alliance systems dividing Europe into unfriendly camps as well as the economic rivalry and the arms race among the Great Powers.
MacMillan makes a remarkable analysis of the years prior to the war, attributing the conflict to the many ideas developing during the period (Social Darwinism, which ranked human societies as if they were species, nationalism, hopes for a better world, etc.) and to the role of individual nations. She provides an insight into the ambitions of rising Germany and Japan, the French and Russian revenge, and the fears of declining England and barely surviving Austria-Hungary.
MacMillan looks into the pressures that influenced the policy of each of the countries. Examining the diplomatic crisis on the Balkans, she gives a good explanation for the Serbian and Austrian inability to resolve their conflict peacefully.
“The War that Ended Peace” is a remarkably enjoyable and helpful book to help you unravel at least partially the tangled causes of “The War To End All Wars”.
June 24, 2018
This book was a little much for me. I found it interesting but tedious. It is overflowing with information and sometimes I think that it could have been organized a little better. At times, I felt like I was sucked into a black hole of minutia about every facet and every aspect of the political landscape of the entire continent of Europe several years prior to the outbreak of WWI. There is a lot of great information here but you had better really be committed reader to get through all of this. I would really be excited about an abridged version.
I will say that it got more interesting as it moved along. Every chapter ends with a teaser and just when I thought the author may tie everything together she meanders down a different path. I also didn’t need the paragraph or two of physical characteristics and gossip about each and every historical figure, no matter how small a role they played in this story. Still, there was a lot of interesting information here. A few things stuck with me. Nationalism trumped socialism. Even the socialists inevitably supported the war. There were 40 different languages spoken in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, like the Ottoman Empire, the break up was inevitable.
I think that the Kaiser’s blank check to Austria-Hungary was a huge mistake. The Germans had the military might and I think they could have reigned in their ally. Also, had Austria Hungary attacked Serbia right away the World War may not have happened. I was also frustrated with Von Moltke and the German high command. When the Kaiser, after negotiating with his cousins in England, told Von Moltke to scrap the invasion of France through Belgium and attack only Russia, Von Moltke said that that wasn’t possible. Finally, I long for what could have been if Germany would have won the war and the Kaiser was able to implement the massive progressive reforms that he had dreamed about during the war such as ending hotel parties for the upper class and sponsoring high speed racing.
This book is not concise and to the point but if you are interested in events leading up to WWI than this book is comprehensive. Still, I would have appreciated reading an abridged version.
I will say that it got more interesting as it moved along. Every chapter ends with a teaser and just when I thought the author may tie everything together she meanders down a different path. I also didn’t need the paragraph or two of physical characteristics and gossip about each and every historical figure, no matter how small a role they played in this story. Still, there was a lot of interesting information here. A few things stuck with me. Nationalism trumped socialism. Even the socialists inevitably supported the war. There were 40 different languages spoken in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, like the Ottoman Empire, the break up was inevitable.
I think that the Kaiser’s blank check to Austria-Hungary was a huge mistake. The Germans had the military might and I think they could have reigned in their ally. Also, had Austria Hungary attacked Serbia right away the World War may not have happened. I was also frustrated with Von Moltke and the German high command. When the Kaiser, after negotiating with his cousins in England, told Von Moltke to scrap the invasion of France through Belgium and attack only Russia, Von Moltke said that that wasn’t possible. Finally, I long for what could have been if Germany would have won the war and the Kaiser was able to implement the massive progressive reforms that he had dreamed about during the war such as ending hotel parties for the upper class and sponsoring high speed racing.
This book is not concise and to the point but if you are interested in events leading up to WWI than this book is comprehensive. Still, I would have appreciated reading an abridged version.
June 8, 2017
WWI is just fascinating. I've been trying to learn more about this period as I see it as a grand operatic tragedy, full of lessons, parallels, and warnings for us contemporary folk. I tend to have a bit more knowledge of the War itself than the events preceding, so this was a very useful and informative read for me.
First off, I think this book is excellent. It is very readable, well-written, and actually quite exhaustive. Lord only knows how much research went into this thing, the depth and breadth here is impressive. I don't think many writers can pull off such history at this level of quality. MacMillan also draws out interesting sketches of all the various personalities and characters, which makes the book more readable because you feel a certain intimacy and understanding of these people.
Anyways, I'm going into this book feeling relatively confident. I've been learning more and more about this era, and one of the problems I still have is I get lost in all the intricacies, the various rotating cast of characters and personalities, the internal politics, international incidents, and double-dealing diplomacy. But that will not happen this time I promised myself. No, not this time! I got this, gonna really focus and not get lost in the underground warrens of this thing, just because there are 20 French guys all with similar sounding names that seem to rhyme with "jambon," no, that will not intimidate me. They (who is they? I don't know, but they're def trying) can't stop me and my increasing comprehension and domination of WWI.
But you know, WWI is just too crazy, and it always happens like this: a solid feeling of comprehension envelops me as I'm getting a handle on some Austro-Hungarian foreign diplomat, I'm understanding his background, his possible motivations, his machinations, his biscuit-eating habits, and then *POOF* he is dismissed by a grouchy leader or dies and now he is gone from the matrix. NOOOOOO, don't do this to me! And of course he is replaced by some guy with a confusingly similar name and probably the same goddamn mustache and vastly different biscuit-eating habits. At least that's how it all feels. The general vibe though is all these various characters are doing their little machinations, and all I can think is stop being so confusing and being so bad. You guys are wrecking everything!!! (and you're confusing me in the process which is the greater crime!)
Of course remembering each individual character isn't critical, my main goal was to get a feel for how things unfurled, how the international diplomacy was functioning and how the internal politics in the various countries was evolving. How did the situation spin out of control to such a degree? how did Europe manage to squander so much life, wealth, power on such a pointless tragedy? It's a true testament to the capacity for folly we humans harbor. A lot of people helped push things in the wrong direction, not always willfully, but a good amount operated in bad faith and with darker motives and lack of imagination as to potential consequences.
Random thing: did you know Lord Asquith was quite busy during his role in leadership sending long turgid love letters to his mistress? spilling state secrets and talking endlessly about her pet penguins and stuff like that. Maybe he should've focused on training those pet penguins, teach them ninja-skills and the art of war. Would've been the smart and cool thing to do, an army of ninja penguins. Suffice it to say those penguins didn't do #@!$ during the war because Asquith was not a visionary.
At the end of the day, this book helped me learn quite a bit. As with many of the things I read, I wish I could've assimilated more of the info, but I think if I keep reading on this subject I will gradually keep building a stronger knowledge foundation.
Sidenote: I think the closest historical parallel to Trump is Kaiser Wilhelm II. Obviously I have limits in my knowledge of history, but so far he is the one I connect most to Trump. Maybe Mussolini too but tbh I don't know enough about him to make a solid comparison, although superficially it seems like it is there. Kaiser Wilhelm II is a freaking brat, Joffrey-lite, I don't have many good things to say about him hehe.
First off, I think this book is excellent. It is very readable, well-written, and actually quite exhaustive. Lord only knows how much research went into this thing, the depth and breadth here is impressive. I don't think many writers can pull off such history at this level of quality. MacMillan also draws out interesting sketches of all the various personalities and characters, which makes the book more readable because you feel a certain intimacy and understanding of these people.
Anyways, I'm going into this book feeling relatively confident. I've been learning more and more about this era, and one of the problems I still have is I get lost in all the intricacies, the various rotating cast of characters and personalities, the internal politics, international incidents, and double-dealing diplomacy. But that will not happen this time I promised myself. No, not this time! I got this, gonna really focus and not get lost in the underground warrens of this thing, just because there are 20 French guys all with similar sounding names that seem to rhyme with "jambon," no, that will not intimidate me. They (who is they? I don't know, but they're def trying) can't stop me and my increasing comprehension and domination of WWI.
But you know, WWI is just too crazy, and it always happens like this: a solid feeling of comprehension envelops me as I'm getting a handle on some Austro-Hungarian foreign diplomat, I'm understanding his background, his possible motivations, his machinations, his biscuit-eating habits, and then *POOF* he is dismissed by a grouchy leader or dies and now he is gone from the matrix. NOOOOOO, don't do this to me! And of course he is replaced by some guy with a confusingly similar name and probably the same goddamn mustache and vastly different biscuit-eating habits. At least that's how it all feels. The general vibe though is all these various characters are doing their little machinations, and all I can think is stop being so confusing and being so bad. You guys are wrecking everything!!! (and you're confusing me in the process which is the greater crime!)
Of course remembering each individual character isn't critical, my main goal was to get a feel for how things unfurled, how the international diplomacy was functioning and how the internal politics in the various countries was evolving. How did the situation spin out of control to such a degree? how did Europe manage to squander so much life, wealth, power on such a pointless tragedy? It's a true testament to the capacity for folly we humans harbor. A lot of people helped push things in the wrong direction, not always willfully, but a good amount operated in bad faith and with darker motives and lack of imagination as to potential consequences.
Random thing: did you know Lord Asquith was quite busy during his role in leadership sending long turgid love letters to his mistress? spilling state secrets and talking endlessly about her pet penguins and stuff like that. Maybe he should've focused on training those pet penguins, teach them ninja-skills and the art of war. Would've been the smart and cool thing to do, an army of ninja penguins. Suffice it to say those penguins didn't do #@!$ during the war because Asquith was not a visionary.
At the end of the day, this book helped me learn quite a bit. As with many of the things I read, I wish I could've assimilated more of the info, but I think if I keep reading on this subject I will gradually keep building a stronger knowledge foundation.
Sidenote: I think the closest historical parallel to Trump is Kaiser Wilhelm II. Obviously I have limits in my knowledge of history, but so far he is the one I connect most to Trump. Maybe Mussolini too but tbh I don't know enough about him to make a solid comparison, although superficially it seems like it is there. Kaiser Wilhelm II is a freaking brat, Joffrey-lite, I don't have many good things to say about him hehe.
June 28, 2017
The period before World War 1 seems to come into season roughly every generation. A new crop of historians begin to plough the rich field of controversy, blame and nostalgia in search of new insights, or at least to fulfill the insatiable appetite of a new generation of readers. The appeal lies in a number of factors - the complex interaction of events, motives and personalities bears all the fascination of the most gripping of true crimes. Like the Jack the Ripper case, the books and documentaries continue to pour forth.
The cycle began soon after the conclusion of hostilities, as participants published studies and document collections designed to deflect blame. The effort was not purely academic as Germany sought to escape the massive reparations demanded at Versailles, underpinned by the famous ‘War Guilt’ clause. The German histories were reinforced by US historians including Harry Barnes and Sidney Fay. He argued that all the powers were to blame. The most significant author arguing against these ‘revisionist’ works was Italian Luigi Albertini who spent almost twenty years writing Le origini della guerra del 1914 (1942). In its English edition it contained over 2000 pages of research and explanations, having interviewed virtually all of the surviving participants in the immediate events of summer 1914. His books are still recognised as one of the best sources.
After the Second World War had been digested another generation approached the topic, with the benefit of greater distance. Ironically it was Fritz Fischer, a German historian who became virtually the first historian for decades to put virtually the entire blame for the war on Germany in his landmark work Griff Nach der Weltmacht (1961). He was strongly attacked as a traitor by other German historians. The provocative English historian A J P Taylor argued for a complacent reliance on the old “Concert of Europe” and unstoppable military plans in War By Timetable.
The centennial of the war saw an astonishing number of fresh works appear on the subject. Probably Margaret MacMillan’s The War That Ended Peace is one of the most prominent, although The Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clark has apparently achieved the most publicity and high sales, especially in Germany where over 200,000 copies are reported to have sold. This is likely to be partially due to Clark’s views being closer to Taylor’s than Fischer’s! A bookshelf could be filled with just some of the other efforts - Sean McMeekin’s The Russian Origins of the First World War and July 1914, Paul Ham’s 1914: The Year The World Ended, Max Hasting’s Catastrophe, David Fromkin’s Europe’s Last Summer, T.G. Otte’s July Crisis. Over coming years I will review and compare some of these works.
MacMillan’s book seemed like a good reliable place to begin my quest. Understanding the twentieth century for most people over forty with an interest in history is a gripping pursuit. All of us either personally or through our family have seen the effects of a century of profound change and extraordinary violence. The so-called thirty years war (not a term I personally agree with) hung over the lives of the late Victorians and the ‘great generation’ of the early twentieth century, and despite its destruction also acted as the catalyst for the age of prosperity that followed. Finding the explanation for the carnage of the trenches and the holocaust leads us to July 1914, but one quickly realises that the quest begins earlier.
Michael Howard in The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century begins his chapter on the World Wars at the turn of the century with two events that suggested that European world hegemony was under threat - the defeat of Spain by the USA, and the humiliation of Russia by Japan. MacMillan also begins her story in the milieu of 1900 with the Paris Exposition as centrepiece. She describes a world of faith in science and Progress with a capital P. The book then turns to diplomacy. The first few chapters zoom in on Germany and Britain, the leading nations economically and in Germany’s case apparently gripped by jealousy. The book describes how the nascent alliances of 1900 - the Dual Alliance of Austria-Hungary and Germany, the Franco-Russian alliance - became ever more important as crutches of security. Russia relied on French finance. France’s lingering fear of Germany following the Franco-Prussian War lead her to dream of an alliance where she could “lean simultaneously on Russia and England against Germany”. Germany ended up tied to Austria-Hungary almost by default. As a German ambassador said: “How often do I ask myself whether it is really worth it to attach ourselves so firmly to this state which is almost falling apart and to continue the exhausting work of pulling it along with us. But I cannot see any other constellation that could replace … an alliance with the Central European power”.
MacMillan expertly ranges through the great powers, analysing their power structures, diplomacy, strategic options and the outlook of their leadership.
This is old fashioned diplomatic history. We arrive at chapter 9 before we ask “What Were They Thinking?”, an examination of European’s world view. MacMillan makes clear her belief that the decisions for and against war “were made by a surprisingly small number, and those men - few women played a role - came largely but not entirely from the upper classes”. Most of the chapter focusses on the elite - the arts, philosophy and in particular social darwinism. Nationalism and imperialism were natural outgrowths of elite obsessions with power and vitality. Militarism and war became glamourous.
MacMillan then explores social movements and beliefs in more detail - the peace movements and conversely the military planners. “A general war, fought at the heart of Europe, was becoming thinkable”. Again we focus on that ‘small number’ - intellectuals, financiers and the peace movement. Most of the countries of western Europe by this time had (or close to had) universal male suffrage. MacMillan spends a few pages on the Second International which through some member parties such as the SPD in Germany had a mass membership. This coverage is good, but again focusses on the leadership. One of the problems with this approach to history emphasising the individual and diplomacy is the risk of ignoring the masses. Perhaps this isn’t so serious in this period when we know that the final decision-making was taken by Presidents, Foreign Secretaries, Emperors and General Staffs. It does seem important though to consider what the views of the majority were, what influence they had through the limited democratic process and to what extent they impacted upon decision making. The sense from the book is very little but I would have liked to see a bit more consideration of this, even if the conclusion was that the ‘great man’ theory in looking at the end of peace is entirely justified.
And so from the war plans we move to the final eight chapters, a rich and detailed narrative of the crises, Sarajevo assassination and the end of the “Concert of Europe”. The impression of bluster and of crises averted is built up deftly and makes the complacency of summer 1914 (above all that of British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey) comprehensible. The length of time from the assassination to the outbreak of war, usually brushed over, is revealed in full as a month of slow, contingent and unpredictable developments. I was almost on the edge of my seat at the end of July as German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg suggested that Germany would not take any territory from France after the war, and would respect Belgium’s integrity after the war. I think MacMillan is a little kind in even suggesting that this might have been a genuine attempt at avoiding a general war. Most of the German and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in July seems disingenuous. This is not to say that others were faultless. Doubtless Grey’s opaqueness with regards to Britain’s intentions betrayed uncertainty and left an opening for Germany to engage in wishful thinking.
MacMillan’s excellent Introduction supplies most of the interpretation in the book, as well as her attitude to the past and its study. “Very little in history is inevitable”, “the part played in human affairs by mistakes, muddle or simply poor timing”, “inertia, memories of past clashes or fear of betrayal”, “a fundamentally weak character”. She certainly doesn’t ignore “the arms race, rigid military plans, economic rivalry, trade wars, imperialism with its scramble for colonies, or the alliance systems dividing Europe into unfriendly camps”. The book does tend though to reinforce the importance of the character and decisions of individuals, chance and the course of events. MacMillan does find some factors “more culpable” (blameworthy?) than others - Austria-Hungary’s intense desire to punish Serbia, Germany’s uncompromising backing of her, Russia’s haste to mobilise. More profitable however is the deeper examination of the previous couple of decades to identify why in summer 1914, with yet another crisis, war instead of continued peace was chosen. This book is an excellent source of information and explanation to understanding the reasons behind that decision.
The cycle began soon after the conclusion of hostilities, as participants published studies and document collections designed to deflect blame. The effort was not purely academic as Germany sought to escape the massive reparations demanded at Versailles, underpinned by the famous ‘War Guilt’ clause. The German histories were reinforced by US historians including Harry Barnes and Sidney Fay. He argued that all the powers were to blame. The most significant author arguing against these ‘revisionist’ works was Italian Luigi Albertini who spent almost twenty years writing Le origini della guerra del 1914 (1942). In its English edition it contained over 2000 pages of research and explanations, having interviewed virtually all of the surviving participants in the immediate events of summer 1914. His books are still recognised as one of the best sources.
After the Second World War had been digested another generation approached the topic, with the benefit of greater distance. Ironically it was Fritz Fischer, a German historian who became virtually the first historian for decades to put virtually the entire blame for the war on Germany in his landmark work Griff Nach der Weltmacht (1961). He was strongly attacked as a traitor by other German historians. The provocative English historian A J P Taylor argued for a complacent reliance on the old “Concert of Europe” and unstoppable military plans in War By Timetable.
The centennial of the war saw an astonishing number of fresh works appear on the subject. Probably Margaret MacMillan’s The War That Ended Peace is one of the most prominent, although The Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clark has apparently achieved the most publicity and high sales, especially in Germany where over 200,000 copies are reported to have sold. This is likely to be partially due to Clark’s views being closer to Taylor’s than Fischer’s! A bookshelf could be filled with just some of the other efforts - Sean McMeekin’s The Russian Origins of the First World War and July 1914, Paul Ham’s 1914: The Year The World Ended, Max Hasting’s Catastrophe, David Fromkin’s Europe’s Last Summer, T.G. Otte’s July Crisis. Over coming years I will review and compare some of these works.
MacMillan’s book seemed like a good reliable place to begin my quest. Understanding the twentieth century for most people over forty with an interest in history is a gripping pursuit. All of us either personally or through our family have seen the effects of a century of profound change and extraordinary violence. The so-called thirty years war (not a term I personally agree with) hung over the lives of the late Victorians and the ‘great generation’ of the early twentieth century, and despite its destruction also acted as the catalyst for the age of prosperity that followed. Finding the explanation for the carnage of the trenches and the holocaust leads us to July 1914, but one quickly realises that the quest begins earlier.
Michael Howard in The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century begins his chapter on the World Wars at the turn of the century with two events that suggested that European world hegemony was under threat - the defeat of Spain by the USA, and the humiliation of Russia by Japan. MacMillan also begins her story in the milieu of 1900 with the Paris Exposition as centrepiece. She describes a world of faith in science and Progress with a capital P. The book then turns to diplomacy. The first few chapters zoom in on Germany and Britain, the leading nations economically and in Germany’s case apparently gripped by jealousy. The book describes how the nascent alliances of 1900 - the Dual Alliance of Austria-Hungary and Germany, the Franco-Russian alliance - became ever more important as crutches of security. Russia relied on French finance. France’s lingering fear of Germany following the Franco-Prussian War lead her to dream of an alliance where she could “lean simultaneously on Russia and England against Germany”. Germany ended up tied to Austria-Hungary almost by default. As a German ambassador said: “How often do I ask myself whether it is really worth it to attach ourselves so firmly to this state which is almost falling apart and to continue the exhausting work of pulling it along with us. But I cannot see any other constellation that could replace … an alliance with the Central European power”.
MacMillan expertly ranges through the great powers, analysing their power structures, diplomacy, strategic options and the outlook of their leadership.
This is old fashioned diplomatic history. We arrive at chapter 9 before we ask “What Were They Thinking?”, an examination of European’s world view. MacMillan makes clear her belief that the decisions for and against war “were made by a surprisingly small number, and those men - few women played a role - came largely but not entirely from the upper classes”. Most of the chapter focusses on the elite - the arts, philosophy and in particular social darwinism. Nationalism and imperialism were natural outgrowths of elite obsessions with power and vitality. Militarism and war became glamourous.
MacMillan then explores social movements and beliefs in more detail - the peace movements and conversely the military planners. “A general war, fought at the heart of Europe, was becoming thinkable”. Again we focus on that ‘small number’ - intellectuals, financiers and the peace movement. Most of the countries of western Europe by this time had (or close to had) universal male suffrage. MacMillan spends a few pages on the Second International which through some member parties such as the SPD in Germany had a mass membership. This coverage is good, but again focusses on the leadership. One of the problems with this approach to history emphasising the individual and diplomacy is the risk of ignoring the masses. Perhaps this isn’t so serious in this period when we know that the final decision-making was taken by Presidents, Foreign Secretaries, Emperors and General Staffs. It does seem important though to consider what the views of the majority were, what influence they had through the limited democratic process and to what extent they impacted upon decision making. The sense from the book is very little but I would have liked to see a bit more consideration of this, even if the conclusion was that the ‘great man’ theory in looking at the end of peace is entirely justified.
And so from the war plans we move to the final eight chapters, a rich and detailed narrative of the crises, Sarajevo assassination and the end of the “Concert of Europe”. The impression of bluster and of crises averted is built up deftly and makes the complacency of summer 1914 (above all that of British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey) comprehensible. The length of time from the assassination to the outbreak of war, usually brushed over, is revealed in full as a month of slow, contingent and unpredictable developments. I was almost on the edge of my seat at the end of July as German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg suggested that Germany would not take any territory from France after the war, and would respect Belgium’s integrity after the war. I think MacMillan is a little kind in even suggesting that this might have been a genuine attempt at avoiding a general war. Most of the German and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in July seems disingenuous. This is not to say that others were faultless. Doubtless Grey’s opaqueness with regards to Britain’s intentions betrayed uncertainty and left an opening for Germany to engage in wishful thinking.
MacMillan’s excellent Introduction supplies most of the interpretation in the book, as well as her attitude to the past and its study. “Very little in history is inevitable”, “the part played in human affairs by mistakes, muddle or simply poor timing”, “inertia, memories of past clashes or fear of betrayal”, “a fundamentally weak character”. She certainly doesn’t ignore “the arms race, rigid military plans, economic rivalry, trade wars, imperialism with its scramble for colonies, or the alliance systems dividing Europe into unfriendly camps”. The book does tend though to reinforce the importance of the character and decisions of individuals, chance and the course of events. MacMillan does find some factors “more culpable” (blameworthy?) than others - Austria-Hungary’s intense desire to punish Serbia, Germany’s uncompromising backing of her, Russia’s haste to mobilise. More profitable however is the deeper examination of the previous couple of decades to identify why in summer 1914, with yet another crisis, war instead of continued peace was chosen. This book is an excellent source of information and explanation to understanding the reasons behind that decision.
October 18, 2014
It's taken me an extraordinarily long time to listen to this audiobook. This was mostly because the edition I acquired from Audible.com didn't download properly, stopped playing about twenty one chapters in and I then listened to another book before going back to fix the problem.
In any event, I've now finished listening to all 31 hours and 34 minutes of the book and I've come to a conclusion. Much as I love listening to audiobooks, I'll think twice before listening to rather than reading any more non-fiction, or at least, to any more history. This wasn't my first experience of listening to a non-fiction audiobook, but it was my first experience of listening to such a dense, fact-focused work. Listening was my choice: it was the least expensive way for me to acquire the book and the quickest for me to listen to a very long work. (Or at least it would have been but for the technology fail.) However, I missed being able to read footnotes /endnotes. I missed being able to easily remind myself of who's who by flicking back a few pages. I missed seeing photographs. I missed reading a bibliography.
Another drawback of this particular audiobook was the narrator, Richard Burnip. He was so slow that for the first time ever I listened to a book on double speed, or at least on 1.5 x speed. Added to Mr Burnip's slowness of speech was his annoying habit of pronouncing "Quai d'Orsay" as "Kye d'Orsay". Every time he said it - and not surprisingly, it's a phrase that comes up reasonably often in a work about the origins of WWI - I winced.
As for the work itself, others have written excellent reviews about its content and there's no point in me repeating what has been said in much better reviews than I could write. Suffice to say that MacMillan is an excellent writer and that what she writes about the origins of WWI is both interesting and sobering. Wars may be fought differently today, but the role of such factors as political and territorial ambitions, over-inflated egos, accidents and mistakes as contributors to war is still relevant today.
So five stars for the book itself, two stars for the audiobook. I'm relieved that I finally finished it.
April 7, 2015
Margaret MacMillan begins her book about the events leading up to World War I with the Paris Exposition of 1900. It celebrated the best in arts, sciences, and technology around the world. But new technology also fueled an arms race, especially between naval powers, and created weapons that led to an enormous loss of life in the Great War.
The major players in the world events are brought to life with interesting quotes, pictures, and cartoons from the era. The book discusses how the creation of alliances, while important in defense, also had a threatening effect. Germany felt surrounded, and aggressively considered going to war before their neighbors built up their military strength. Colonial powers divided up the world to obtain natural resources and good ports for commerce without regard for the native people. Crises in Morocco and the Balkans had to be dealt with in the early part of the century. Nationalism was brewing in Serbia and the other Balkan nations. Elaborate war plans were drawn up by the great European nations, and illustrated in the book's excellent maps. Then Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo by a Serbian nationalist.
MacMillan does not point her finger at just one nation as the cause of World War I, but gives a balanced view of events. One wonders if peace would have been negotiated with a different group of people creating foreign policy. MacMillan seems to feel that there was a rush to war in the final weeks before August 4, 1914 without other options being seriously considered. She ends her book by writing, "If we want to point fingers from the twenty-first century we can accuse those who took Europe into war of two things. First, a failure of imagination in not seeing how destructive such a conflict would be and second, their lack of courage to stand up to those who said there was no choice left but to go to war. There are always choices."
The major players in the world events are brought to life with interesting quotes, pictures, and cartoons from the era. The book discusses how the creation of alliances, while important in defense, also had a threatening effect. Germany felt surrounded, and aggressively considered going to war before their neighbors built up their military strength. Colonial powers divided up the world to obtain natural resources and good ports for commerce without regard for the native people. Crises in Morocco and the Balkans had to be dealt with in the early part of the century. Nationalism was brewing in Serbia and the other Balkan nations. Elaborate war plans were drawn up by the great European nations, and illustrated in the book's excellent maps. Then Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo by a Serbian nationalist.
MacMillan does not point her finger at just one nation as the cause of World War I, but gives a balanced view of events. One wonders if peace would have been negotiated with a different group of people creating foreign policy. MacMillan seems to feel that there was a rush to war in the final weeks before August 4, 1914 without other options being seriously considered. She ends her book by writing, "If we want to point fingers from the twenty-first century we can accuse those who took Europe into war of two things. First, a failure of imagination in not seeing how destructive such a conflict would be and second, their lack of courage to stand up to those who said there was no choice left but to go to war. There are always choices."
November 11, 2020
Wow. This book is easily the second to best account I've read of the events immediately preceding the Great War. Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August still holds the top spot in my own humble opinion. But back to MacMillan's masterwork; the book's main message is that people in this world have choices, and those choices have consequences. If several world leaders had tried diplomacy, the Great War may have never been fought. Or it may at least have been delayed. This book gets a prominent nod from me and a choice spot among my WW1 books on my shelves. An excellent read.
January 25, 2021
I didn't go into The War that Ended Peace blind. I've learned about the alliances, and some of pre-war crises, heads of state, and circumstances in the countries involved in the Great War. But I wanted something much more detailed. At 645 pages of text, Margaret MacMillan's look into the causes of the First World War provides all the context a reader could want.
We begin with a fairly general introduction, which MacMillan concludes by writing: "Most of the copious literature on the events of 1914 understandably asks why the Great War broke out. Perhaps we need to ask another sort of question: why did the long peace not continue?" From here, the book goes into chapters detailing the main countries involved, and then progresses into looking at the several pre-war crises and alliances. I think it was smart to front-load the book with the profile of each country and then branch out from there.
MacMillan is successfully able to show that Europe pre-1914 was quite peaceful with no major wars for some time. The turn of the century was also a period of progress - but some of this progress put pressure on nations. You had arms and naval races, the building of railways which would allow troops to be deployed quickly, the development of more accurate and more destructive weapons, and the growing size of armies. To not keep up was to be left behind. You also had the issues of empire, and the balance of power in Europe. And the growing alliance treaties - which were often founded defensively - certainly could look like a threat to those not involved.
There were those that always advocated for war, or at least pushed for it in times of crisis. Some thought their men were becoming 'weak' and 'soft' and saw war as a way to toughen them up. Other countries, such as Russia, saw a potential war as a way to unite their people for a common cause. MacMillan also discusses the popularity of taking the offensive, rather than being on the defensive, in war. This was something that came to dominate many war plans. Even the idea of war becoming much longer and drawn out had already been figured by peace activists, politicians and the military. As Moltke the Elder told the Reichstag back in 1890: "Gentlemen, it may be a war of seven years' or of thirty years' duration - and woe to him who sets Europe alight, who puts the first fuse to the powder keg!"
MacMillan leads us through the annexation of Bosnia, the two Moroccan crises and the Balkan Wars, to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. We see the ultimatum from Austria-Hungary to Serbia and the resulting mobilizations. Once the mobilizations began, war seemed inevitable. A telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg, Germany's chancellor, is as follows: "Kindly impress on M. Sazanov [Russia's foreign minister] very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then European war would scarcely be prevented." And such was the case.
I obviously can't touch on everything in this review, but MacMillan offers a very detailed look at all the main factors that went into the outbreak of the war. I can't think of much to nitpick, but one thing I noticed right away (which I see I didn't comment on in my review of MacMillan's War) is that she's clearly not a fan of the Oxford comma. I can't tell you how many times I had to go back and re-read a sentence because I read it wrong due to the lack of a comma.
I didn't find this book to be dry at all. I'm not saying every single page held my attention with gripping intensity, but MacMillan's account is highly readable - don't let the length put you off. There was so much going on, and so many people she needed to write about; this book could have easily been unbearably boring. But MacMillan seems to have a talent for bringing the time period and its people to life in a way that makes them stand out. Her little anecdotes about these people - although maybe not entirely necessary - humanize them in the best way. And the organization of information was excellent.
I was debating between buying this book or Christopher Clark's The Sleepwalkers. Both have excellent reviews, so I'm sure you couldn't go wrong either way. But I can certainly vouch for the quality of MacMillan's comprehensive and very accessible account.
We begin with a fairly general introduction, which MacMillan concludes by writing: "Most of the copious literature on the events of 1914 understandably asks why the Great War broke out. Perhaps we need to ask another sort of question: why did the long peace not continue?" From here, the book goes into chapters detailing the main countries involved, and then progresses into looking at the several pre-war crises and alliances. I think it was smart to front-load the book with the profile of each country and then branch out from there.
MacMillan is successfully able to show that Europe pre-1914 was quite peaceful with no major wars for some time. The turn of the century was also a period of progress - but some of this progress put pressure on nations. You had arms and naval races, the building of railways which would allow troops to be deployed quickly, the development of more accurate and more destructive weapons, and the growing size of armies. To not keep up was to be left behind. You also had the issues of empire, and the balance of power in Europe. And the growing alliance treaties - which were often founded defensively - certainly could look like a threat to those not involved.
There were those that always advocated for war, or at least pushed for it in times of crisis. Some thought their men were becoming 'weak' and 'soft' and saw war as a way to toughen them up. Other countries, such as Russia, saw a potential war as a way to unite their people for a common cause. MacMillan also discusses the popularity of taking the offensive, rather than being on the defensive, in war. This was something that came to dominate many war plans. Even the idea of war becoming much longer and drawn out had already been figured by peace activists, politicians and the military. As Moltke the Elder told the Reichstag back in 1890: "Gentlemen, it may be a war of seven years' or of thirty years' duration - and woe to him who sets Europe alight, who puts the first fuse to the powder keg!"
MacMillan leads us through the annexation of Bosnia, the two Moroccan crises and the Balkan Wars, to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. We see the ultimatum from Austria-Hungary to Serbia and the resulting mobilizations. Once the mobilizations began, war seemed inevitable. A telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg, Germany's chancellor, is as follows: "Kindly impress on M. Sazanov [Russia's foreign minister] very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then European war would scarcely be prevented." And such was the case.
I obviously can't touch on everything in this review, but MacMillan offers a very detailed look at all the main factors that went into the outbreak of the war. I can't think of much to nitpick, but one thing I noticed right away (which I see I didn't comment on in my review of MacMillan's War) is that she's clearly not a fan of the Oxford comma. I can't tell you how many times I had to go back and re-read a sentence because I read it wrong due to the lack of a comma.
I didn't find this book to be dry at all. I'm not saying every single page held my attention with gripping intensity, but MacMillan's account is highly readable - don't let the length put you off. There was so much going on, and so many people she needed to write about; this book could have easily been unbearably boring. But MacMillan seems to have a talent for bringing the time period and its people to life in a way that makes them stand out. Her little anecdotes about these people - although maybe not entirely necessary - humanize them in the best way. And the organization of information was excellent.
I was debating between buying this book or Christopher Clark's The Sleepwalkers. Both have excellent reviews, so I'm sure you couldn't go wrong either way. But I can certainly vouch for the quality of MacMillan's comprehensive and very accessible account.
December 14, 2018
I read this on a trip, and it's a good overview of how the cataclysm of WW1 came to be. One of the interesting points made by the author is that the destruction and economic collapse in Germany and Russia which were caused by WW1 really created the opportunity for the US to become a world power. History might have run differently in that regard if Europe had not been so damaged, economically and in human terms by the war. Sometime I need to find a good overview of cultural and artistic change engendered by the war; as far as I can tell, the loss of young artists and writers in the war directly impacted, in a negative way, the culture of the 20th Century. But I digress.
Ultimately, one must point the finger at Kaiser Wilhelm when blame is apportioned. Absent his foolish "blank check" there would have been no war. That said, the British and French were not prudent in their alliances, Russia was sort of a basket case already ripe for unrest, and all the nations were wildly unrealistic about what the war would be like. No one understood the massive effect that firepower (artillery and machine guns) would have. That said, the British and French generals were incredibly dense and unwilling to accept the evidence that heroic charges against fortified positions was simply a way to murder one's own soldiers.
Ultimately, one must point the finger at Kaiser Wilhelm when blame is apportioned. Absent his foolish "blank check" there would have been no war. That said, the British and French were not prudent in their alliances, Russia was sort of a basket case already ripe for unrest, and all the nations were wildly unrealistic about what the war would be like. No one understood the massive effect that firepower (artillery and machine guns) would have. That said, the British and French generals were incredibly dense and unwilling to accept the evidence that heroic charges against fortified positions was simply a way to murder one's own soldiers.
July 24, 2014
Next month marks the 100th anniversary of the beginning of World War I - the second-most destructive conflict in the history of Western Civilization - and famed historian and Oxford professor Margaret MacMillan’s latest work attempts to shed new light on the often debated and seldom agreed upon questions of why such a blight on the record of human existence could have taken place. Following her previous book, Paris: 1919, which focuses on the peace settlement at war’s end, The War That Ended Peace takes us back to the mid 19th century and leads us right up to the summer of 1914 in order to explain the circumstances, events, and (more than anything) personalities which made war possible.
World War I has long been a powerful example used to prove the Realist argument. After all, trade and economic interdependence, according to the Liberal view, should make war less likely, and yet both were quite robust amongst European powers right up until fighting began. Liberals, such as Erik Gartzke, hit back at this notion, noting that the war began amongst the continent’s less economically integrated powers (Serbia, Austria-Hungary), who then pulled the major powers into the conflict through their alliances. This may be a compelling argument, but it hardly establishes a Liberal narrative for explaining the war which can rival the Realist story. Where MacMillan’s book is helpful is in pushing against the conventional trope - a militaristic Germany which sought conquest above all else - and showing that all of the European powers share some responsibility in the conflict, but the greatest factors were systemic.
With some liberty, we can condense the many causes of World War I down to three meta-level factors: Napoleon, Industrialization, Nationalism.
-Napoleon did more to innovate the way wars are fought than any other individual in the last two millennia. The introduction of popular conscription, the Levee en Masse, changed the way armies operated, and it took 15 years and seven coalitions for the rest of Europe to balance against this new threat. (It should also be noted that Napoleon changed the way artillery was used on the battlefield, but that is less important in this narrative) Even after Napoleon’s defeat, European armies would continue to be conscript based, with large standing forces requiring a lot of money and logistical support.
-Industrialization helped to support those new, grand armies. The ability to make a lot of weapons quickly, as well as trains and ships to carry the men and materiel, made war exponentially more deadly. The invention of new types of weapons, such as crew-served machine guns, heavy artillery pieces, tanks, and chemical weapons, can be blamed for the inconceivably high casualty rate of the Great War.
-Nationalism was the putrid byproduct of the age of democratization. Individuals developed a newfound love of their states, and an inherent contempt for all rivals. This, perhaps more than anything, was the feeling that made Europe a “powderkeg” in the years leading up to 1914.
MacMillan’s book is a triumph which weaves us through this antebellum period and shows us how such a tragedy could occur. While reading the book, one will undoubtedly become frustrated with the pettiness of the disputes (One example of note: the falling out between Kaiser Wilhelm II and his cousin, King George V, began over Britain’s insistence that Germany not be allowed to build three ships to Britain’s five, because that would not allow for the level of British naval supremacy to which they were accustomed), but should note that it is not a flaw of the author, but of the subject. MacMillan is also keen to avoid buying into red herring arguments, such as Wilhelm’s infamous speech declaring Germany’s desire to have its “place in the sun”, and the unfortunate remark of his foreign secretary regarding Belgian neutrality being “just a piece of paper”. These statements have long been easy arguments used to justify the actions of the Entente, but they largely whitewash the actions of Germany’s opponents. France had wanted war with Germany for a generation. Embittered by their loss of territory in 1871, France was looking for an excuse to fight a war which might see Alsace and Lorraine returned to her. Russia was embarrassed by its loss to Japan in 1905, and wanted a war in which to showcase its military strength and win back some prestige. Britain, long regarded as the least belligerent power in the war, refused to budge on a German naval buildup for fear of the effect such an action might have on its own prestige. Such blustering, combined with a severe lack of appreciation for the effect industrialization had made on warfare, and a surplus of confidence in how quickly each state’s forces would be able to defeat its opponents, led to one of the great failures in the history of mankind.
World War I has long been a powerful example used to prove the Realist argument. After all, trade and economic interdependence, according to the Liberal view, should make war less likely, and yet both were quite robust amongst European powers right up until fighting began. Liberals, such as Erik Gartzke, hit back at this notion, noting that the war began amongst the continent’s less economically integrated powers (Serbia, Austria-Hungary), who then pulled the major powers into the conflict through their alliances. This may be a compelling argument, but it hardly establishes a Liberal narrative for explaining the war which can rival the Realist story. Where MacMillan’s book is helpful is in pushing against the conventional trope - a militaristic Germany which sought conquest above all else - and showing that all of the European powers share some responsibility in the conflict, but the greatest factors were systemic.
With some liberty, we can condense the many causes of World War I down to three meta-level factors: Napoleon, Industrialization, Nationalism.
-Napoleon did more to innovate the way wars are fought than any other individual in the last two millennia. The introduction of popular conscription, the Levee en Masse, changed the way armies operated, and it took 15 years and seven coalitions for the rest of Europe to balance against this new threat. (It should also be noted that Napoleon changed the way artillery was used on the battlefield, but that is less important in this narrative) Even after Napoleon’s defeat, European armies would continue to be conscript based, with large standing forces requiring a lot of money and logistical support.
-Industrialization helped to support those new, grand armies. The ability to make a lot of weapons quickly, as well as trains and ships to carry the men and materiel, made war exponentially more deadly. The invention of new types of weapons, such as crew-served machine guns, heavy artillery pieces, tanks, and chemical weapons, can be blamed for the inconceivably high casualty rate of the Great War.
-Nationalism was the putrid byproduct of the age of democratization. Individuals developed a newfound love of their states, and an inherent contempt for all rivals. This, perhaps more than anything, was the feeling that made Europe a “powderkeg” in the years leading up to 1914.
MacMillan’s book is a triumph which weaves us through this antebellum period and shows us how such a tragedy could occur. While reading the book, one will undoubtedly become frustrated with the pettiness of the disputes (One example of note: the falling out between Kaiser Wilhelm II and his cousin, King George V, began over Britain’s insistence that Germany not be allowed to build three ships to Britain’s five, because that would not allow for the level of British naval supremacy to which they were accustomed), but should note that it is not a flaw of the author, but of the subject. MacMillan is also keen to avoid buying into red herring arguments, such as Wilhelm’s infamous speech declaring Germany’s desire to have its “place in the sun”, and the unfortunate remark of his foreign secretary regarding Belgian neutrality being “just a piece of paper”. These statements have long been easy arguments used to justify the actions of the Entente, but they largely whitewash the actions of Germany’s opponents. France had wanted war with Germany for a generation. Embittered by their loss of territory in 1871, France was looking for an excuse to fight a war which might see Alsace and Lorraine returned to her. Russia was embarrassed by its loss to Japan in 1905, and wanted a war in which to showcase its military strength and win back some prestige. Britain, long regarded as the least belligerent power in the war, refused to budge on a German naval buildup for fear of the effect such an action might have on its own prestige. Such blustering, combined with a severe lack of appreciation for the effect industrialization had made on warfare, and a surplus of confidence in how quickly each state’s forces would be able to defeat its opponents, led to one of the great failures in the history of mankind.
August 29, 2019
This is a very long book, and it’s very academic and therefore pretty dry. It reads like a dissertation, and I constantly zoned out listening to this. It goes through every country involved in WWI, gives a life sketch of every major national/military leader, and how they responded to the other countries. It’s good information—given in great detail—but hard to stay interested in.
It’s written by a British academic, so when she started taking digs at post-WWII America, my reaction was first,
and second,
All the author’s credibility as an objective historian died there.
So what led to WWI? Pride — human nature, one-up-man-ship, fear
Book Blog
It’s written by a British academic, so when she started taking digs at post-WWII America, my reaction was first,
and second,
All the author’s credibility as an objective historian died there.
So what led to WWI? Pride — human nature, one-up-man-ship, fear
Book Blog
September 16, 2014
I approached this mammoth volume, by an admirable Canadian historian (with ties to my old college,) full of enthusiastic anticipation. There are far too many varnished centennial ceremonies marking the start of World War One these days, when the stupidity and extremity of the war's slaughter should be the focus, and I looked for a caustic and probing analysis of how such a meaningless disaster could have happened.
After 645 pages of text and another 70 pages of notes and bibliography, I certainly know a great deal more. But about what? Margaret MacMillan has given us reams of detail about the personalities of the kings, tsars and sundry other aristocrats of the time -- their lovers, their hunting lodges, their summer get-togethers, their family ties, even their health-fixated visits to special spas. We have seen the agonies of ambassadors trying for the most part to keep their home countries from fighting with the nations in which they serve (and whose exclusive gentlemen's clubs they so enjoy visiting.)
Much of the narrative that this detail surrounds is both tedious and fascinating. Who remembers the long list of mini-crises and pseudo-feuds that preceded World War One -- the battle over which European country would be top dog in Morocco, France or Germany? the embarrassing defeat of Russia in its war with Japan? the feud between France and Britain over control of remote parts of Sudan? Britain's plan to give Portugal's colonies to Germany? the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913? Italy's takeover of Libya? Yet MacMillan successfully argues that this backdrop both accustomed countries to thinking of war as a feasible recourse and led them to expect that any such war would be very short and decisive. This level of her analysis is both provocative and insightful.
Yet World War One was entirely different. First, it was generalized across all of Europe and beyond, unlike these mini-crises. And second, it brought cataclysmic and grinding destruction that killed eight and a half million, left another eight million prisoners or missing, and wounded twenty-one million. The alliances that had been formed (Germany and Austria-Hungary vs. France and Russia and Britain) turned yet another Balkan crisis into a gross collapse of European civilization.
It is this that I hoped this book might somehow explain. But it does not.
MacMillan defends her focus on the personalities at the top of the social structure. These are the men (and they are all men) who made decisions that brought about war, and they could (she seems to say) have made different decisions and the war would not have taken place. Yet her analytical problem is that many of the key people on whom she focuses in the book appeared not to want war as their countries headed into the conflict. Tsar Nicholas had to be virtually coerced into signing the order to mobilize Russia's troops. The Chancellor of Germany (Bethmann Hollweg) was opposed to war, urging Austria to use mediation to solve its conflict with Serbia, and Kaiser Wilhelm was supportive of him. And in Britain the cabinet was badly split and likely against war until Germany invaded Belgium. Despite these doubts, the military leadership in each of the main countries involved came to take the lead and the drive toward war continued.
Clearly there was a militarization of societies taking place during this pre-war period that became decisive in the final phase. Yet this book does not focus on that underlying dynamic. It seems to be a social process that requires an examination of political economy factors to understand. Yet MacMillan does not operate on that level.
As a result, in the end, her book is for me unsatisfactory in its personalistic and anecdotal perspective. This is a book with much useful information, which is a helpful source on events and differing viewpoints. But I had hoped for so much more. Why did the peace movement of the time fail so badly? What lessons are there in its failure to build a stronger social base for itself? Why did the political left fail so completely in its anti-war strategy? Why did the economic benefits of disarmament for social expenditure not receive more support? Was it simply that the franchise was so limited? Or did political parties of the time fail to underline the social cost of military spending? This book could have helped with such questions given a different, more substantive framework of analysis.
After 645 pages of text and another 70 pages of notes and bibliography, I certainly know a great deal more. But about what? Margaret MacMillan has given us reams of detail about the personalities of the kings, tsars and sundry other aristocrats of the time -- their lovers, their hunting lodges, their summer get-togethers, their family ties, even their health-fixated visits to special spas. We have seen the agonies of ambassadors trying for the most part to keep their home countries from fighting with the nations in which they serve (and whose exclusive gentlemen's clubs they so enjoy visiting.)
Much of the narrative that this detail surrounds is both tedious and fascinating. Who remembers the long list of mini-crises and pseudo-feuds that preceded World War One -- the battle over which European country would be top dog in Morocco, France or Germany? the embarrassing defeat of Russia in its war with Japan? the feud between France and Britain over control of remote parts of Sudan? Britain's plan to give Portugal's colonies to Germany? the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913? Italy's takeover of Libya? Yet MacMillan successfully argues that this backdrop both accustomed countries to thinking of war as a feasible recourse and led them to expect that any such war would be very short and decisive. This level of her analysis is both provocative and insightful.
Yet World War One was entirely different. First, it was generalized across all of Europe and beyond, unlike these mini-crises. And second, it brought cataclysmic and grinding destruction that killed eight and a half million, left another eight million prisoners or missing, and wounded twenty-one million. The alliances that had been formed (Germany and Austria-Hungary vs. France and Russia and Britain) turned yet another Balkan crisis into a gross collapse of European civilization.
It is this that I hoped this book might somehow explain. But it does not.
MacMillan defends her focus on the personalities at the top of the social structure. These are the men (and they are all men) who made decisions that brought about war, and they could (she seems to say) have made different decisions and the war would not have taken place. Yet her analytical problem is that many of the key people on whom she focuses in the book appeared not to want war as their countries headed into the conflict. Tsar Nicholas had to be virtually coerced into signing the order to mobilize Russia's troops. The Chancellor of Germany (Bethmann Hollweg) was opposed to war, urging Austria to use mediation to solve its conflict with Serbia, and Kaiser Wilhelm was supportive of him. And in Britain the cabinet was badly split and likely against war until Germany invaded Belgium. Despite these doubts, the military leadership in each of the main countries involved came to take the lead and the drive toward war continued.
Clearly there was a militarization of societies taking place during this pre-war period that became decisive in the final phase. Yet this book does not focus on that underlying dynamic. It seems to be a social process that requires an examination of political economy factors to understand. Yet MacMillan does not operate on that level.
As a result, in the end, her book is for me unsatisfactory in its personalistic and anecdotal perspective. This is a book with much useful information, which is a helpful source on events and differing viewpoints. But I had hoped for so much more. Why did the peace movement of the time fail so badly? What lessons are there in its failure to build a stronger social base for itself? Why did the political left fail so completely in its anti-war strategy? Why did the economic benefits of disarmament for social expenditure not receive more support? Was it simply that the franchise was so limited? Or did political parties of the time fail to underline the social cost of military spending? This book could have helped with such questions given a different, more substantive framework of analysis.
January 11, 2016
I was certain that I had written a review of this book when I read it. No trace of one here now.
Just to say that I am a big fan of MacMillan's. As in Paris, 1919, in The War That Ended Peace, she uses detailed information of the individuals involved to build an overall picture of the years, months and, specifically, days leading up to the event. She is not looking to assign blame on any one person or country. She is presenting a panorama of how the players, generally through their own hubris, stumbled into a war that was destructive to them all.
This is an example of academic excellence applied to a topic for general consumption. Recommended for everyone.
Just to say that I am a big fan of MacMillan's. As in Paris, 1919, in The War That Ended Peace, she uses detailed information of the individuals involved to build an overall picture of the years, months and, specifically, days leading up to the event. She is not looking to assign blame on any one person or country. She is presenting a panorama of how the players, generally through their own hubris, stumbled into a war that was destructive to them all.
This is an example of academic excellence applied to a topic for general consumption. Recommended for everyone.
November 5, 2014
As the centennial year of the commencement of the Great War has arrived, MacMillan returns to offer the other book-end in her Great War history tomes. While she's already examined the fallout of World War I, now she looks to decipher what brought it about and how peace dissolved. Using a plethora of documents, back stories, and her flair for the historical narrative, MacMillan tells a tale that entertains as well as educates the curious reader. MacMillan reminds the reader of the blood ties of three of the major players in the European arena: King George V of England, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, and Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, all of whom were grandchildren to the famed Queen Victoria. This conflict was, however, more than a simple interaction of cousins on the world scene. MacMillan posits that war emerged for three major reasons: war plans were previously completed, political and geographic manoeuvres were plentiful, and Europe was a powder keg ready to explode. Through her wonderful style and presentation, MacMillan rehashes some of what many historians have already presented, but does so in such a compelling way that the reader cannot help but want to read and learn more.
While many historians will point to the Schlieffen Plan, which outlined Germany's possible roles in a European conflict, as the main impetus for war, this is far from the only predestined document laid out by the European powers. MacMillan illustrates throughout the text that many of the major powers had their own plans for attack and defence ahead of formal conflict in 1914. Britain and France were both keen to have ideas and plans laid out to ensure they were not left surprised, while Russia also illustrated their own schemes to ensure Austro-Hungary did not utilise the Balkans solely for themselves. In discussing some of these plans, countries like Germany tried to flex their muscles and keep smaller nations in line. One illustration of this comes when Belgium's monarch was in Berlin on a state visit and Kaiser Wilhelm II made it clear that Germany could and would use the Belgian territory, should the need arise. The plans in the hands of the military and political leaders of the day were excellent fodder to feed the fire of war in Europe and surely helped to propagate the Great War's birth, if not its sustained endurance for four years.
The political and geographic manoeuvring in the area was anything but docile leading up to the Great War, as MacMillan is clear to show in her tome. Europe had been through many wars over the past hundred years, leaving many nations at odds with one another, but without a strong impetus to strike out. MacMillan posits that the build-up was along the lines of political oneupmanship as well as a desire to seek betterment and a competition to build the strongest navy or amass the largest arsenal. These build-ups, tied to the political allegiances forged and the happenings in some of the smaller parts of Europe, offered up the domino game that precipitated war and disaster in Europe in the summer of 1914. Throughout the tome, MacMillan reminds the reader of the Franco-Prussian War and how that sowed the seeds of bitterness amongst these two states, but that other wars also kept the taste of battle in the mouths of leaders. Look only to Russia's drubbing in the Russo-Japanese War or the Baltic wars and it is apparent that war was anything but a foreign concept to the continent. One can also look at the shifts within the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires to see that states sought to shed themselves of the subjugation previously placed on them and live independently. Powerful states sought to ensure this freedom, while others, namely Austria wanted anything but the disintegration of its collective, which led to chest-banging and alliance movements. Surely MacMillan's arguments cannot fall on deaf ears and shows how Europe needed only time and the right collection of aggression to fall into another state of war.
As mentioned above, Europe was anything but a peaceful collection of states leading up to 1914. One can only wonder if MacMillan placed tongue firmly in cheek with the title of her tome, for peace was but a fleeting thought on the European continent. With smaller wars popping up all across the continent or recently turning to embers, it is no surprise that the Great War came to pass, or that the alliances were as strong as they ended up being. Aggression needed only a small event to bring about an explosion, which occurred with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand that fateful day in 1914. The dominoes fell and the powder keg blew sky high. Perhaps the only surprising thing was that it took that long for the war machine to rev its engine. MacMillan does not hide the fact that aggression and animosity could be seen in every meeting between leaders and that legislatures had deputies ready to cast votes as soon as a motion could be made. Weaving together these numerous clashes into the build-up of one final explosion shows how MacMillan has mastered her storytelling abilities, keeping the reader enthralled and wondering how peace could have lasted as long as it did. That said, she does, especially in her epilogue, push strongly that the blame for the larger conflict was tossed around like a hot potato, from state to state, and, in her mind, was always only one path. Peace was not completely off the table, at least in MacMillan's eye.
The curious reader ought surely to take the time to ingest this great tome and allow all its nuances to help shape opinions. That said, MacMillan is a historian and therefore the text is, at times, highly technical and academic. This is not a criticism, but merely a guide to allow the reader to realise how thorough the tome can be. Surely not for the amateur historian with only a passing interest. The story gets quite detailed and the use of research is remarkable, leading to intricate accounts of information and back stories.
I mentioned this in a previous review and can now offer a great recommendation to readers who, like myself, thoroughly enjoy Great War history. Reading this tome as the first in a series would prove highly beneficial. Follow this up with David Fromkin's EUROPE'S LAST SUMMER, which depicts more accusatory arguments surrounding the commencement of war in Europe. MacMillan offers a wonderful post-war analysis in her PARIS 1919 and examines how the victors did all in their power to lambaste Germany and leave it wounded to the point of wanting retribution. Parallel to MacMillan's work, Fromkin returns with A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE, which shows the European victors' dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. Wonderful reading to show how volatile (and yet highly interesting) early 20th century politics could be. Both authors are stellar in their depiction of events and ability to pull the reader in and seek more information.
Kudos and many thanks, Dr. MacMillan for this wonderful piece of work. I loved it from the outset and learned so much about the nuances of the lead-up to the European conflict.
While many historians will point to the Schlieffen Plan, which outlined Germany's possible roles in a European conflict, as the main impetus for war, this is far from the only predestined document laid out by the European powers. MacMillan illustrates throughout the text that many of the major powers had their own plans for attack and defence ahead of formal conflict in 1914. Britain and France were both keen to have ideas and plans laid out to ensure they were not left surprised, while Russia also illustrated their own schemes to ensure Austro-Hungary did not utilise the Balkans solely for themselves. In discussing some of these plans, countries like Germany tried to flex their muscles and keep smaller nations in line. One illustration of this comes when Belgium's monarch was in Berlin on a state visit and Kaiser Wilhelm II made it clear that Germany could and would use the Belgian territory, should the need arise. The plans in the hands of the military and political leaders of the day were excellent fodder to feed the fire of war in Europe and surely helped to propagate the Great War's birth, if not its sustained endurance for four years.
The political and geographic manoeuvring in the area was anything but docile leading up to the Great War, as MacMillan is clear to show in her tome. Europe had been through many wars over the past hundred years, leaving many nations at odds with one another, but without a strong impetus to strike out. MacMillan posits that the build-up was along the lines of political oneupmanship as well as a desire to seek betterment and a competition to build the strongest navy or amass the largest arsenal. These build-ups, tied to the political allegiances forged and the happenings in some of the smaller parts of Europe, offered up the domino game that precipitated war and disaster in Europe in the summer of 1914. Throughout the tome, MacMillan reminds the reader of the Franco-Prussian War and how that sowed the seeds of bitterness amongst these two states, but that other wars also kept the taste of battle in the mouths of leaders. Look only to Russia's drubbing in the Russo-Japanese War or the Baltic wars and it is apparent that war was anything but a foreign concept to the continent. One can also look at the shifts within the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires to see that states sought to shed themselves of the subjugation previously placed on them and live independently. Powerful states sought to ensure this freedom, while others, namely Austria wanted anything but the disintegration of its collective, which led to chest-banging and alliance movements. Surely MacMillan's arguments cannot fall on deaf ears and shows how Europe needed only time and the right collection of aggression to fall into another state of war.
As mentioned above, Europe was anything but a peaceful collection of states leading up to 1914. One can only wonder if MacMillan placed tongue firmly in cheek with the title of her tome, for peace was but a fleeting thought on the European continent. With smaller wars popping up all across the continent or recently turning to embers, it is no surprise that the Great War came to pass, or that the alliances were as strong as they ended up being. Aggression needed only a small event to bring about an explosion, which occurred with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand that fateful day in 1914. The dominoes fell and the powder keg blew sky high. Perhaps the only surprising thing was that it took that long for the war machine to rev its engine. MacMillan does not hide the fact that aggression and animosity could be seen in every meeting between leaders and that legislatures had deputies ready to cast votes as soon as a motion could be made. Weaving together these numerous clashes into the build-up of one final explosion shows how MacMillan has mastered her storytelling abilities, keeping the reader enthralled and wondering how peace could have lasted as long as it did. That said, she does, especially in her epilogue, push strongly that the blame for the larger conflict was tossed around like a hot potato, from state to state, and, in her mind, was always only one path. Peace was not completely off the table, at least in MacMillan's eye.
The curious reader ought surely to take the time to ingest this great tome and allow all its nuances to help shape opinions. That said, MacMillan is a historian and therefore the text is, at times, highly technical and academic. This is not a criticism, but merely a guide to allow the reader to realise how thorough the tome can be. Surely not for the amateur historian with only a passing interest. The story gets quite detailed and the use of research is remarkable, leading to intricate accounts of information and back stories.
I mentioned this in a previous review and can now offer a great recommendation to readers who, like myself, thoroughly enjoy Great War history. Reading this tome as the first in a series would prove highly beneficial. Follow this up with David Fromkin's EUROPE'S LAST SUMMER, which depicts more accusatory arguments surrounding the commencement of war in Europe. MacMillan offers a wonderful post-war analysis in her PARIS 1919 and examines how the victors did all in their power to lambaste Germany and leave it wounded to the point of wanting retribution. Parallel to MacMillan's work, Fromkin returns with A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE, which shows the European victors' dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. Wonderful reading to show how volatile (and yet highly interesting) early 20th century politics could be. Both authors are stellar in their depiction of events and ability to pull the reader in and seek more information.
Kudos and many thanks, Dr. MacMillan for this wonderful piece of work. I loved it from the outset and learned so much about the nuances of the lead-up to the European conflict.
December 14, 2013
The author has written a book exploring the aftermath of World War 1, "1919." Here, she examines events leading to the outbreak of that same war.
She outlines, year by year, developments leading up to worldwide conflict. She tries to answer the question (Page xxv): "How could Europe have done this to itself and the world?" She observes that this is a war that did not have to happen; major powers may well have been able to call the conflict off up until August 4th of 1914 when Great Britain decided to enter the upcoming war. Without using the term, she speaks of "path dependence," in which decision after decision slowly narrows the range of options available. In this instance, as the range diminished, the chance of war increased.
The first chapter captures the European situation in 1900. However, the book goes back three decades--with the Franco-Prussian War--to provide context and lay out sources of later friction. The authord describes situations facing a number of key countries: Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Japan, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire. . . Changes were taking place, with some countries in obvious decline (the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary). Russia's military had been wrecked in its war with Japan.
Some of the events and issues that were involved in the run up to war include: The naval buildup between Germany and Great Britain, leading to mistrust between the two; the development of an agreement between Russia and France that led Germany to feel encircled; development of plans for war that depended on mobilization, with an implicit understanding that if someone started mobilizing, one needed to respond or be caught without being ready for conflict; a series of crises, some of which are obscure now but were nerve wracking then--Morocco, Fashoda, the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles), the Balkans, the Kiel Canal, Bosnia, and--finally--Franz Ferdinand's assassination in Sarajevo. Up until the last incident, the countries had been able to work out not going into the abyss of war. After Sarajevo? The dominoes began to fall, as countries began mobilizing and promising to come to the aid of their allies (although Italy backed away from its alliance).
Overall, this is a nice examination of factors leading to war.
She outlines, year by year, developments leading up to worldwide conflict. She tries to answer the question (Page xxv): "How could Europe have done this to itself and the world?" She observes that this is a war that did not have to happen; major powers may well have been able to call the conflict off up until August 4th of 1914 when Great Britain decided to enter the upcoming war. Without using the term, she speaks of "path dependence," in which decision after decision slowly narrows the range of options available. In this instance, as the range diminished, the chance of war increased.
The first chapter captures the European situation in 1900. However, the book goes back three decades--with the Franco-Prussian War--to provide context and lay out sources of later friction. The authord describes situations facing a number of key countries: Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Japan, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire. . . Changes were taking place, with some countries in obvious decline (the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary). Russia's military had been wrecked in its war with Japan.
Some of the events and issues that were involved in the run up to war include: The naval buildup between Germany and Great Britain, leading to mistrust between the two; the development of an agreement between Russia and France that led Germany to feel encircled; development of plans for war that depended on mobilization, with an implicit understanding that if someone started mobilizing, one needed to respond or be caught without being ready for conflict; a series of crises, some of which are obscure now but were nerve wracking then--Morocco, Fashoda, the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles), the Balkans, the Kiel Canal, Bosnia, and--finally--Franz Ferdinand's assassination in Sarajevo. Up until the last incident, the countries had been able to work out not going into the abyss of war. After Sarajevo? The dominoes began to fall, as countries began mobilizing and promising to come to the aid of their allies (although Italy backed away from its alliance).
Overall, this is a nice examination of factors leading to war.
August 2, 2023
Margaret MacMillan's The War That Ended Peace was among the many books written for the centennial of the First World War, trying to explain how Europe's different superpowers backed into the world's most destructive conflict (up to that point) without fully intending to. MacMillan's book has most of the same strengths as her earlier work on the Paris Peace Conference: an eye for sharp character sketches and an ability to convey broader political-diplomatic context with finesse. The book's sharpest passages lie in her assessment of Europe's prewar statesman, from the bellicose military leadership of Britain and France who foresaw war as inevitable, to the hopelessly reactionary Tsar Nicholas and his court, to Germany's erratic Kaiser Wilhelm, whom she portrays with some sympathy as a well-meaning monarch whose personality flaws unwittingly antagonized his fellow statesmen. MacMillan dutifully recounts the escalating crises, imperial rivalries and power clashes that led to war, culminating in the "damn thing in the Balkans" that exploded the powder keg in 1914. It's here that the book starts to lose interest; MacMillan presents these events fluently enough, but her analyses and dramatization adds nothing to earlier works by Barbara Tuchman (The Proud Tower), Robert K. Massie (Dreadnought) and others, which explore them with more color and insight. From the crop of contemporaries, War That Ended Peace is easily bested by Christopher Clark's The Sleepwalkers, which has a more controversial thesis (blaming the war principally on Serbia, with some unwitting assistance from a belligerent Kaiser) than MacMillan's rehash of the "collective responsibility" thesis which long dominated popular discourse on the Great War's origins, but is increasingly debatable. Thus MacMillan's book is readable and conversant in its subject matter, but at nearly 700 pages of text one wonders about the need to revisit this well-worn topic, if she has very little new to say.
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