Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy

International Interactions, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2010

Posted: 26 Jun 2010 Last revised: 29 Aug 2010

See all articles by Dursun Peksen

Dursun Peksen

East Carolina University; University of Memphis

Cooper Drury

University of Missouri

Date Written: June 26, 2010

Abstract

This paper seeks to analyze the impact sanctions have on democracy. We argue that economic sanctions worsen the level of democracy because the economic hardship caused by sanctions can be used as a strategic tool by the targeted regime to consolidate authoritarian rule and weaken the opposition. Furthermore, we argue that economic sanctions create new incentives for the political leadership to restrict political liberties to undermine the challenge of sanctions as an external threat to their authority. Using time-series cross-national data (1972-2000), the findings show that both the immediate and longer term effects of economic sanctions significantly reduce the level of democratic freedoms in the target. The findings also demonstrate that comprehensive economic sanctions have greater negative impact than limited sanctions. These findings suggest that sanctions can create negative externalities by reducing the political rights and civil liberties in the targeted state.

Keywords: Economic Sanctions, Democracy, Democratization, International Sanctions, Coercive Diplomacy

Suggested Citation

Peksen, Dursun and Peksen, Dursun and Drury, A. Cooper, Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy (June 26, 2010). International Interactions, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1630664

Dursun Peksen (Contact Author)

East Carolina University ( email )

Greenville, NC 27858
United States

University of Memphis ( email )

Memphis, TN 38152
Memphis, TN usa 38152-3370
United States

A. Cooper Drury

University of Missouri ( email )

309 Professional Bldg.
Columbia, MI 65211-6030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://web.missouri.edu/~drurya

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