How Raisi wants to handle the Iran nuclear deal

Ebrahim Raisi will reportedly be sworn in as Iran’s next president on August 5. The most important issue his administration will immediately face is the diplomatic talks on the revival of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

In line with the decision of the conservative-dominated JCPOA “implementation committee,” which operates under the auspices of the secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the president-elect’s foreign policy team has been entrusted with the continuation of the nuclear talks.

According to the committee, the administration of moderate President Hassan Rouhani's six rounds of indirect talks with the US in Vienna to revive the JCPOA have been unsuccessful, as Washington has not been persuaded to lift all sanctions and provide a guarantee not to withdraw from the accord once again. Of note, former US president Donald Trump in 2018 unilaterally withdrew the Barack Obama-era deal.

What Raisi wants

Raisi seeks what is referred to as the proper implementation of the JCPOA, which he has repeatedly stated is something that has been lacking from the get go. According to him, only a powerful government in Iran can achieve this. This improved implementation of the JCPOA would require new concessions from the US.

From the perspective of Raisi and his foreign policy team, the JCPOA ultimately resulted in the deterioration of the Iranian people’s living conditions. The Rouhani administration is said to have deprived Iran from benefitting from the accord by failing to hold its counterparts to account over its violations of its commitments.

Wanting to reach a better implemented JCPOA, Raisi’s team will adopt a tough stance in the upcoming nuclear talks with a policy of making maximalist demands, offering minimal concessions and using the acceleration of the development of the country’s nuclear program as leverage.

Looking ahead, Raisi’s foreign policy team will focus on four main issues:

Tearing down the ‘Sanctions Wall’: To Raisi’s team, any extension of previously terminated sanctions or the imposition of new sanctions since the JCPOA was signed is against the deal, and all such restrictions must therefore be lifted. In particular, all sanctions imposed or extended under the Trump-era policy of constructing a “sanctions wall”—meant to sabotage any revival of the deal—must be lifted. In this context, Raisi will seek an end to the Obama administration's visa restrictions on Iranian citizens and visitors to Iran. He will also seek an end to penalties under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) as well as all sanctions imposed over Iran’s alleged support for terrorism and human rights record. The Raisi team considers the lifting of these sanctions as necessary to meet the demands of Iran’s supreme leader.

Guaranteeing the irreversibility of sanctions lifting: Another thing on the agenda of Raisi’s diplomatic team is the pursuit of the complete lifting of sanctions in the US Congress, so that the JCPOA’s current 180-day sanctions waivers and their renewal by presidential executive order are eliminated. The Raisi team believes that the mere suspension as opposed to lifting of sanctions has no economic benefit for Iran, because after Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA, companies and banks are far more fearful of doing business with Iranian entities.

In addition, some reports have suggested that Iran’s latest demand is that the US agree to a clause that makes a future American withdrawal from the deal contingent on United Nations approval.

Normalization of Iran's trade ties: Conservatives and the moderate Rouhani administration alike believe that even after the implementation of the JCPOA, various obstacles hindered the development of Iran's international trade. Both accuse the US of failing to implement the nuclear deal in good faith, leaving Iran with many issues related to banking transactions. The latter includes free Iranian access to foreign exchange reserves as well as oil revenues.

Accordingly, current obstacles brought about by US sanctions that must be resolved include: the obligation of the host government of Iran's oil revenue proceeds to maintain these revenues in special and monitored accounts; the impossibility of transferring these revenues to a third party; and the impossibility of Iran’s receipt of banknotes and free usage of such financial resources in trade.

These obstacles are very difficult to overcome, and require changes to restrictions beyond those outlined in the JCPOA, such as the U-turn embargo, revisions to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network agenda (FinCEN), the removal of warning reports, and the removal of Iran from jurisdiction lists of countries where there is a high possibility of money laundering. Experts believe that the main reason behind the many barriers to banking and monetary transactions with Iran is the Islamic Republic’s failure to approve legislation necessary to permanently exit the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist. This has occurred despite the Rouhani administration’s years of efforts in this regard. The FATF-related bills have not been approved due to opposition from conservatives in parliament, the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council.

Verification: Iran’s supreme leader has previously said with reference to the verification of the lifting of US sanctions, "The Americans should lift all the sanctions, after this we will verify [it] and then we will return to the JCPOA, and this is a definite policy." Raisi’s foreign policy team believes that verification of sanctions lifting requires the implementation of a wide range of measures. These could include anything from the unfettered export of Iranian crude oil as well as Iran’s receipt and free usage of such revenues over a period of several months, to the possible entry and investment from large foreign companies in Iran. President Hassan Rouhani has previously stated that the lifting of US sanctions can be verified within the span of a single day, and even in a matter of hours. In contrast, his conservative opponents at home say a minimum of three to six months is necessary for verification of sanctions lifting. This could greatly complicate a possible US re-entry into the JCPOA, as the Joe Biden administration has insisted that a return to commitments under the accord must be mutual and virtually simultaneous.   

Raisi's likely approach to the JCPOA was re-affirmed by the supreme leader in a meeting with the outgoing Rouhani cabinet on July 28. "The Americans say in words and promise that we will remove the sanctions, but they did not and will not lift the sanctions," Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said, adding, "Even now, when the Americans are asked to guarantee that they will not violate the agreement in the future, they say ‘we do not guarantee that’."

According to Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's latest, and final, report to the Iranian parliament’s national security and foreign policy commission on the JCPOA, the US has agreed to suspend some sanctions rather than lifting them altogether. The report does not address issues such as the verification of the lifting of sanctions, the provision of guarantees that the US will not withdraw from the nuclear deal once again, and the lifting of some additional non-nuclear sanctions to facilitate the normalization Iran's international trade in accordance with the JCPOA.

In addition to focusing on these dimensions, Raisi’s foreign policy team will likely use the rapid development as well as international monitoring of Iran's nuclear program as a pressure lever.

The road ahead

Raisi and his foreign policy team face very serious obstacles in the way of achieving their goals. These include Iran's dire economic situation and growing public discontent at home; the Biden administration's weak position in Washington and its inability to offer more concessions to Iran; and, the increase in Israeli sabotage of Tehran's nuclear facilities.

Finally, and most importantly, the status of Iran's nuclear program may reach a point whereby the restoration of the JCPOA is no longer on anyone’s agenda. Such a scenario would increase the risk of war and tension more than ever.

In his final report to the parliament, Zarif warned against insisting on maximalist demands and prolonged negotiations, arguing that any agreement has its own strengths and weaknesses—and that either side's attempt to defeat the other will only lead to a negative-sum game.

The outgoing Iranian chief diplomat’s warning was an apparent reference to the extended stretch of fruitless talks between Iran and western powers between 2007 and 2013, during which the negotiating team was led by hardliner Saeed Jalili. His entourage now constitutes a significant segment of Raisi’s diplomatic team. The prevailing sentiment within that camp can be summarized in one remark by Raisi’s liaison to the foreign ministry, Ali Baqeri-Kani: that only a subjugated government would agree to the restrictions Iran accepted in the JCPOA.