3 Toward Greater Opportunism Balancing and Bandwagoning in Canada-US Relations JUSTIN MASSIE Have Canada-US relations changed since 9/11? This chapter examines the evolution of the Canadian government’s international security policy strategy toward the United States. It does so by using the increasingly popular concepts of “son” and “hard” bandwagoning and balancing to make sense of states’ post–Cold War security behaviour vis-à-vis the United States. It argues that hard bandwagoning has gained prominence under the Harper government, and has the potential to supplant the traditional twin pillars of Canada’s security policy: continental son bandwagoning 1 and transatlantic son balancing. The shin appears less to illustrate a pragmatic adjustment to the continental and international security environments since 9/11 than to refect a neoconservative ideology underpinning the Harper government’s foreign policy. Balancing and Bandwagoning Faced with the absence of a counterbalancing force to the United States’ power in the decade following the end of the Cold War, neorealists abro2 gated their research paradigm to make it et with reality. Some destructuralized neorealism by emphasizing the importance of domestic (public opinion, legislative system, etc.) and ideational (ideology, identity, culture, etc.) determinants of foreign policy to help explain the unexpected fact Justin Massie 50 3 of “underbalancing.” Others widened the range of policies available for realpolitik statecran, most notably to include non-military (economic, diplomatic, and institutional) balancing strategies. In addition to what is now known as “hard” balancing (which realists had previously referred to simply as “balancing”), “son” balancing gained notoriety. It is even said to have replaced traditional hard balancing as the preferred foreign policy of 4 states in the face of US unipolarity. Contrary to hard balancing, son balancing does not directly seek to overthrow US hegemony. Rather, it comprises non-military policies aimed at delaying, frustrating, constraining, or undermining the unilateral exercise of power by the United States, through “territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signalling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition.” Traditional hard balancing, on the other hand, includes measures such as “military buildups, wareghting 5 alliances, and transfers of military technology to U.S. opponents.” Two dimensions are thus central to identifying son balancing: intentions (resistance short of seeking to overthrow US hegemony) and means (non-military). Son balancing not only restrains states’ exercise of power but also infuences their policies “by using institutional mechanisms, rules, norms, and procedures of mutual regulation … This allows them to infuence the dominant power’s policies and increase their bargaining position within the 6 institution.” Weaker or more vulnerable states are “thereby rendering asymmetric power relations less exploitive and commitment more cer7 tain.” In other words, Canada may exercise son balancing against the United States within common institutions, such as NATO and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), by binding the hegemon to institutionalized norms and rules and by restraining its potential unilateralism. The choice to bandwagon with US preponderance is also attributable to the relative benevolence/belligerence of the United States’ power. Indeed, the United States is said to generally adopt policies beneeting other states. It provides public goods such as a stable reserve currency; it enforces the rules and institutions that govern the international political and economic systems; it protects the “global commons” as well as many states from their rivals; it mostly exercises its power through multilateral 8 institutions; and it accepts domestic and external restraints on its power. In addition to the benignity of US hegemony, the United States’ sheer size also explains why states prefer to bandwagon with rather than balance against it. The state of unipolarity, argues William Wohlforth, “is a struc9 ture in which one state’s capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced.” The United States has reached a concentration of power that renders Toward Greater Opportunism 51 counterbalancing futile, as it is prohibitively costly and could lead to the 10 balancer’s annihilation. The varying degrees of cooperation with the United States open the 11 door to distinguishing “son” from “hard” bandwagoning. Understood as the opposite of balancing, bandwagoning can take two forms: modest and indirect or full and open alignment with a more powerful or threaten12 ing state. As Walt suggests, the bandwagoning state “makes asymmetri13 cal concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role.” It freely chooses, or (given its geostrategic predicament) resigns itself to, accommodation of a more powerful or threatening state by accepting its dominance in exchange for greater security and/or autonomy, or 14 other coveted gains. Bandwagoning thus involves a defensive (son) and an opportunistic (hard) dimension: states may son-bandwagon with the dominant power for fear of being forced into obedience, or hard-band15 wagon to proet from it. In Canada’s case, according to Walt, it is because of the United States’ benign policy toward it and because of its own weakness and isolation that Canada has “chosen” to bandwagon with the United 16 States. In sum, the debate over balancing and bandwagoning vis-à-vis the United States emphasizes a wide spectrum of responses to, and explanation of, enduring US hegemony. States adopting realist foreign policies may choose, or be forced to choose, from among the following strategies: • hard balancing – direct military opposition to the most powerful state in order to overthrow its hegemony • son balancing – non-odensive resistance to a threatening power’s policies in order to constrain and/or infuence it • son bandwagoning – modest or indirect support of a threatening or powerful state in order to optimize its security or proet from it • hard bandwagoning – full and open support of the most powerful state in order to proet materially or ideationally from it Counterweights in Canada’s Transatlantic Security Policy Is Canada bandwagoning with or balancing against the United States? As a country sharing a bilateral and a multilateral military alliance with the United States, Canada is onen portrayed by non-Canadians as a band17 wagoning state. But Canadian scholars describe and/or explain their country’s international security policy as one involving a long-standing quest for “counterweights” to the United States, most notably through NATO. So much has been written about the transatlantic “counterweight” 52 Justin Massie in Canadian academia, and so many times has it been cited as a crucial rationale for joining (and continuing to support) the Atlantic Alliance that it can indeed be regarded as a signiecant component of Canada’s strategic 18 culture. This apparent contradiction is merely one of deenition. Galia PressBarnathan, according to whom balancing within a common alliance is an oxymoron, nevertheless argues that NATO members advance two strategies to manage their relations with the United States. “First, they may create a pact of restraint to try to restrain the hegemon and infuence its policies from within the alliance. Second, they may create a division of labour that allows them to oder meaningful contributions to their hegemonic partner … to enhance their bargaining and restraining capability 19 vis-à-vis the hegemon on other issues.” Both strategies therefore entail a desire to restrain the United States while not seeking to overthrow its hegemony, and both involve non-military means of doing so. In other words, what is labelled bandwagoning may in fact represent instances of son balancing. A case in point is Canada’s traditional NATO policy. For most Canadian decision makers, NATO holds the potential to constrain US military interventions and elevate Canada’s status and rank as a prominent and mean20 ingful world actor. Because of its geographic proximity to the United States, its “economic and military vulnerability to rapacious great powers, the United States in particular,” and its “inability to defy continentalist tendencies alone,” argues Michael Tucker, Canada has had need of “coun21 terweights” – Great Britain prior to 1949, and NATO Europe thereaner. This is not out of fear of abandonment, as “son bandwagoning” implies; on the contrary, Canada beneets from the United States’ involuntary security guarantee. It is rather the result of a perceived need to “exert a moderating infuence” on US policies, as Lester B. Pearson put it in 1948. Indeed, despite the hegemon’s perceived benevolence, Pearson feared that the “United States may press the Russians too hard and too fast and not leave them a way out which would save their faces. To lessen this danger, the Western European powers will have to exert a steady and constructive infuence on Washington … The establishment of a North Atlantic Union will give them additional channels through which to exert this moderat22 ing infuence.” For Pearson, preventing US unilateralism was indeed “the 23 erst principle of Canadian diplomacy.” While restricted to collective defence during the Cold War, NATO quickly expanded its security roles and mandates to include peace operations following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It further expanded the scope of its ambition by taking counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and Toward Greater Opportunism 53 capacity-building roles following the attacks of 9/11. This odered Canada new opportunities to attempt to infuence US international security policy, for the principles that had pushed Canada to intervene in Korea in the 1950s and in the Persian Gulf in the early 1990s – active participation in US-led military interventions within a multilateral coalition – could now be undertaken under NATO command. For Canada, this meant the need to signiecantly contribute to NATO-led operations in order to be able to exert a moderating infuence on US policies. The Chrétien government did just that in the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. The prevalence of such strategic thinking was evident in the early anermaths of the attacks of 9/11. On the very day the terrorists struck, the Canadian permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council proposed that, for the erst time in its history, the NATO Charter’s Article 5 on collective defence be invoked. The next day, Prime Minister Chrétien declared that Canada would fully support the United States when action would be taken. A month later, despite the absence of any explicit authorization from the UNSC, Canada announced its participation in the USled operation to overthrow the Taliban regime. In early 2002, it became the fourth-largest military contributor to the operation. Months later, Minister of National Defence John McCallum responded positively to a US request to send troops to Kabul. The Canadian government sought, as expected, to bring the ongoing military operations in Afghanistan under NATO command, just as it would again do in 2005 by redeploying troops to Kandahar in order to expand NATO’s authority throughout the country. Son balancing helps make sense of these decisions. Indeed, they indicate a desire to restrain US unilateralism through the establishment and expansion of a multilateral and institutional command, despite the initial 24 reluctance of some European allies. Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin sought, with some success, to infuence the war in Afghanistan by con25 tributing troops and institutionalizing it within NATO. One may therefore conclude, as former Canadian ambassador to NATO David Wright did earlier regarding Canadian participation in the war against Serbia, that “Ottawa’s infuence on Washington was ensured because of US support 26 for NATO and the need to maintain unity.” Maintaining the relevance and unity of the Atlantic Alliance remained essential to achieving the erst principle of Canadian diplomacy following 9/11, for without Western European “counterweights,” Canada could not dream of edectively curbing the potential excesses of US foreign policy. The war against Iraq represents a further case in point. Because the Chrétien government was not successful in ending a compromise 54 Justin Massie between Western Europe (mostly Germany and France) and the United States, it chose not to support its southern neighbour’s decision to invade Iraq. As Chrétien’s policy adviser Eddie Goldenberg put it: “The circumstances with respect to Kosovo were very diderent in 1999 than they were in Iraq in 2003. Then the Clinton Administration was not pursuing a unilateralist foreign policy; it insisted on the serious participation of Europe 27 and NATO in a military operation.” One may therefore be tempted to conclude that, had Canada’s son balancing strategy been successful – if a compromise had been reached among its trusted allies – Canada would 28 probably have gone od to battle in March 2003. Continental Soft Bandwagoning The most attractive alternative to son balancing is son bandwagoning, that is, modest or indirect support of the United States in order to optimize Canadian security or proet from US preponderance. In its defensive variant, this strategy has been pursued by Canadian decision makers since at least the late 1930s, through a policy conventionally labelled “continentalism.” It refers to a vision of Canadian foreign policy based on the vast and multifaceted network of exchanges (goods, people, capital, ideas, and so on) between Canadian and American societies, and a positive appreci29 ation of its consequences for both societies and governments. Although better known in its economic version, which promotes deeper integration with the United States, in terms of defence, continentalism also rests on the paramountcy of the United States, as well as Canada’s supposed ability to leverage a close relationship with the US government in order to “collateralize [its] bilateral assets” and enjoy greater infuence beyond North 30 America. Rather than seeking to multilaterally constrain US power, as in transatlantic son balancing, Canada should embrace, contribute, and hence bandwagon (sonly or heavily) with US hegemony, according to continentalists. Such policy is perceived as a necessity arising from Canada’s unique geographical position, favourably located next to the world’s sole liberal and benevolent hegemon. Canada-US relations should therefore be recognized as “the indispensable foundation of Canadian foreign policy in all its dimensions … The principal foreign policy challenge for Canada is to manage the forces of silent integration drawing us ever closer to our giant neighbour and to obtain maximum beneet from that integra31 tion.” In other words, bandwagoning appears to represent the foreign policy recommended by many continentalists. Atlanticists disagree, mostly because they do not share continentalists’ assessment of US benign intentions and policies. They fear that the “nat- Toward Greater Opportunism 55 ural” pull toward ever greater North American integration may marginalize Canada’s autonomy to the point of making Canada a mere satellite 32 to the United States. Limiting Canadian foreign policy to its bilateral relationship, no matter how important that relationship is, would undermine the country’s sovereignty, as it would not beneet from the help of its allies and of multilateral institutions in restraining US excesses. Even during the bipolar era of the Cold War, writes historian Desmond Morton, “The Soviet Union was the ultimate threat but the United States was 33 the imminent danger.” Indeed, successive violations of Canadian sovereignty by the United States during and following the Second World War altered Ottawa’s threat analysis in ways favourable to the establishment of a multilateral institution that would manage transatlantic defence relations. For Pearson, “under such a [North Atlantic] treaty the joint planning of the defence of North America would fall into place as part of a larger whole and the digculties arising in Canada from the fear of invasion of 34 Canadian sovereignty by the United States would be diminished.” Yet the inevitable forces underlying North American continentalism have worked against the pursuit of the son balancing strategy espoused by Pearson. Instead, Canada’s continental defence policy has been institutionalized in a solely bilateral – and even binational, through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) – relationship. This strict compartmentalization between bilateral and multilateral defence has “satiseed Washington’s desire to prevent its European allies from interfering in the management of the systems for defending US soil … But 35 more curiously, it has satiseed some Canadian desires as well.” The most important examples of the bilateral (as opposed to multilateral) institutionalization of US-Canadian defence are the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement and NORAD (its creation, renewals, and functional expansions), both of which signiecantly tied Canadian and American security exclusively to each other. Contrary to the opportunistic bandwagoning strategy advocated by some continentalists, it is a mostly defensive variant that characterizes the Canada-US continental security relationship. By bandwagoning with the United States, Canada seeks to optimize its security – deened in terms of autonomy and sovereignty protection – rather than to proet from its neighbour’s power (although it does). This is the result not only of longstanding US pressures on Canadian sovereignty but also of a fundamental geostrategic reality: the indivisibility of North American security. The whole of North America is deemed part of US homeland defence strategy, meaning that an attack on, or emanating from, Canada would invariably be perceived as an attack on the United States. 56 Justin Massie The validity of this norm remained unchanged following the attacks of 9/11. For Ottawa, it meant continuing to accept US ascendency over North American defence in exchange for Canadian assistance to Ameri36 can edorts to protect Canada’s territorial integrity. There are numerous 37 examples, including the Chrétien government’s rejection of the idea of a formal North American “security perimeter” (due to concerns over sovereignty), even as it adopted a series of security measures aimed at reassuring Washington, including intensieed screening processes in ports and airports, a new identiecation card for permanent residents, and new anti-terrorism and immigration bills; the creation of new security and defence institutions (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada [now Public Safety Canada] and Canada Command [now Canadian Joint Operations Command]); the expansion of NORAD’s mandate to include maritime surveillance and missile detection; and the establishment of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. Despite these initiatives, the Chrétien government’s response to 9/ 11 was criticized for its reactiveness, tardiness, and limited scope. The April 2006 State Department report on counterterrorism, for example, deplored Canada’s “liberal immigration policies” for allowing continued 38 terrorist activities in the country. Despite a vast new legislative framework against terrorism, Canada was not able to satisfy US demands. Its counterterrorism strategy, which sought to avoid another 9/11 edect on the Canadian economy, was constrained by the enduring fear over Canadian sovereignty. Preferring son to hard bandwagoning, the Canadian government rejected the idea of a comprehensive security and defence agreement with the United States. It opted to modestly support the United States in its new emphasis on anti-terrorism in order to optimize Canadian security. Focusing on sovereignty protection, it chose minimal and reactive compliance, thereby adapting its continental security policies to meet the hegemon’s needs while retaining signiecant national control over its home territory. Perhaps Ottawa shared Frank Harvey’s assessment that fully meeting 39 US demands would be an impossible task. It sought to reassure Washington that it was doing “enough” by harmonizing many of its policies with those of the United States and by investing modestly in its security and defence apparatus, but refrained from proposing a comprehensive agreement for greater and deeper integration. In other words, the Canadian government preferred a defensive son bandwagoning strategy to an opportunistic hard bandwagoning one. Toward Greater Opportunism 57 Growing Hard Bandwagoning A debate is emerging over the possible transition of Canada’s security policy toward greater (or “heavier”) bandwagoning with the United States. The shin could be attributable to the accession to power of Conservative (and reputedly continentalist) Stephen Harper, or to the growingly multipolar distribution of power due to the rise of China. Regarding the erst, Kim Nossal argues that “Harper’s hyperbolic rhetoric about Canada as America’s ‘most reliable ally’ tends to gloss over the disconnects from 40 both Canadian thought and Canadian practice than can be seen.” This rhetoric/policy gap, he claims, is apparent in both Harper’s continental and forward security policies, including such issues as ballistic missile defence (BMD) and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The gap can be explained by the fact that, unlike during the Cold War era, when Canadian territory had geostrategic importance for the United States, Canada has become “strategically irrelevant” for US defence today. This gives Canada greater leeway to disagree with the United States, for it is less pressured by Washington to shape its defence policy according to US needs. Canada could adord to decline to participate in BMD and in the war against Iraq, as well as to withdraw its combat troops from Afghanistan in 2011, without sudering any substantial retribution from the United States. If Nossal’s assessment is correct, we should expect less bandwagoning as well as soner balancing in Canada’s future foreign and defence policy. Examining Canadian foreign policy in light of China’s rise as a global power, Bruce Gilley comes to the opposite conclusion. He contends that the rise of China makes bandwagoning with the United States ever more appealing. Hence Canada might have to make a greater contribution to US foreign and defence policy, especially if China emerges as an illiberal, 41 revisionist state. Charles Doran makes a similar argument in Chapter 1. The structural change that is slowly occurring in world politics makes the rise of China a major challenge to North America. If, on the contrary, China rises as a responsible, status quo liberal power, it will signiecantly reduce its challenge to US hegemony. “In that scenario,” claims Gilley, “Canada-US relations over Asia might drin apart, but only in a narrow, technocratic sense. In a bigger sense, liberal principles in Asia would have triumphed and with them the fundamental basis of Canada-US rela42 tions.” Therefore, whether or not US hegemony comes to an end, bandwagoning with the United States will remain Canada’s preferred defence policy. Its hard variant is more likely in the context of an emerging revisionist China, whereas a soner variant is to be expected in the context of an emerging status quo China. 58 Justin Massie A third perspective is gaining strength among scholars. It focuses on Nossal’s puzzle – the impact of the Conservative Party as a potentially new “natural governing party” – but reaches Gilley’s conclusion with regard 43 to Canada’s security policy. Since the attacks of 9/11, continentalism has become an increasingly dominant discourse in Canadian foreign policy. The thickening of the border since 9/11 has indeed led many to extend the continentalist logic to the realm of security. Michael Hart, for example, argues that given growing North American economic interdependence, new threats to international security (terrorism, rogue states, weapons of mass destruction), and US unipolarity, Canada must clearly and more vig44 orously bandwagon with the hegemon. This new form of continentalism – neocontinentalism, if you will – is illustrated by the debate surrounding the establishment of a security perimeter. Such a perimeter involves a standardization of Canadian and US procedures regarding the tragc coming from outside North America in order to reduce the controls between the two countries. Aner 9/11, despite repeated calls by US Ambassador Paul Cellucci, the expression “security perimeter” was ogcially banned by the Chrétien government because of its political implication – that any standardization process would end up being an Americanization of Canadian procedures. The idea nonetheless survived among Canadian commentators, especially 45 among conservatives and within the business community. More substantially, the Canada-US Beyond the Border proposal appears to represent a step in that direction. Its ultimate goal, according to one proponent, is to integrate Canadian and American procedures in order “to make the fow of tragc – people, goods and services – within the single biggest bilateral trading relationship in the world as easy as that enjoyed within 46 the European Union.” The concept of a security perimeter thus accepts the indivisibility of North American security, and hence US dominance over it. As Prime Minister Harper has said: “There is no such thing as a threat to the national security of the United States which does not repre47 sent a direct threat to this country.” Canada’s continental security policy should therefore seek to support (bandwagon with) the hegemon’s national security policies. The neocontinentalist prescription for hard bandwagoning is also illustrated with regard to North American ballistic missile defence. Paul Martin’s notorious “no” to BMD is onen portrayed as a failure to bandwagon with the United States. True, it does not constitute an instance of hard bandwagoning, but one could argue that it illustrates a soner variant, for Canada is in fact playing a de facto part in missile defence thanks to an August 2004 agreement permitting NORAD to continue transmitting Toward Greater Opportunism 59 missile warning and assessment data to BMD command and control. This represents a clear example of tacit support given to the US BMD system. Furthermore, during the 2006 federal election, Martin repeatedly claimed that a Conservative government would have Canada “join” BMD. Although Harper did not formally commit to reversing the Liberal’s position, he did specify conditions under which Canada could formally “par48 ticipate.” By opening the door to full support of BMD, he implicitly acknowledged that Canada would adapt its defence policy based on the threats posed to the United States. The motivation for Harper’s approach to continental defence tilts toward hard bandwagoning because it moves from an essentially defensive to a more opportunistic policy toward the United States. Ogcially it strives to enhance Canada’s status as a strong, reliable, and credible mili49 tary partner of the United States. The enhanced credibility it seeks is less about mitigating US pressures on Canadian sovereignty than about gaining infuence over it. As Harper explained: “Not only can we advance our own interests in concert with the United States, the opportunity exists to strengthen Canadian infuence on the Americans, and thus enhance our sovereignty in ways that no encirclement strategy could plausibly do.” He identieed three means to achieve this goal: (1) deploy hard power alongside the US military, including BMD; (2) strengthen Canadian military capabilities; and (3) “ensure that Canada is never again perceived as a 50 potential source of threats” by the United States. Hard bandwagoning, as exposed by Harper, rests upon an assumption that is far from guaranteed: that the Canadian government has the ability and will to infuence US foreign and defence policy. This implies that Ottawa has an alternative grand strategy to that of the US, and that more 51 military capabilities will lead to greater infuence. Whether or not this is true, Harper does believe that refraining from investing in military expenditures or from joining US-led military initiatives such as the invasion of Iraq will make Canada “irrelevant” and, more to the point, destroy its “ability to exert infuence on the events and the allies that will shape 52 our future.” Harper’s hard bandwagoning relates to Gilley’s analysis of China’s rise. Among the reasons that should motivate Canada to focus its foreign policy almost entirely on its southern neighbour is the latter’s liberal, benevolent, and hyper-powerful character. This helps explain why, for neocontinentalists, it is unnecessary to seek to constrain US power within multilateral institutions, for American power is not a threat but an opportunity for Canada. Rather than conceiving of Canada as a dependent or secondary power, neocontinentalism rests upon the belief that Canada 60 Justin Massie is a “foremost” rather than a mere “middle” power. It depicts Canada as a state having huge potential infuence on the international stage if it plays its card well and accepts the (military) responsibilities that come with such rank. “Canada is back as a credible player on the international stage,” proudly claimed Prime Minister Harper in his 2007 Speech from 53 the Throne. This, of course, is consistent with Harper’s characterization 54 of Canada as an “energy superpower” as well as a strong and reliable partner of the United States. The debate surrounding Canadian participation in the Iraq War clearly illustrated that point. “Supporting our allies is 55 the right thing to do,” claimed Harper. He was not referring, evidently, to France and Germany. Whereas for Atlanticists it is necessary to secure a 56 consensus among key Western allies (most notably France) and comply with international law before resorting to the use of force, neither of these criteria applies to the neocontinentalist approach. The United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom represent the only allies on which Canada should rely. Conclusion I have argued that hard bandwagoning has gained prominence under the Harper government, and that it holds the potential of supplanting the traditional twin pillars of Canada’s security policy: continental son bandwagoning and transatlantic son balancing. This means that Canada is likely to pursue policies that seek to leverage its close relationship with the United States in order to gain greater infuence in global adairs, rather than attempt to broker compromises among its closest allies and fear the erosion of its sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States. Unlike continentalism, whose focus was limited to North American defence, neocontinentalism, if it proves enduring, will apply to Canada’s security policy both at home and abroad. The realist concepts of son and hard balancing and bandwagoning were used to support this assertion. For lack of space, I have only briefy discussed the motivations and dynamics of Canada’s evolving behaviour toward the United States, but this analysis suggests that neorealist theory contributes to a better understanding of Canadian foreign policy. If my assessment proves to be accurate, we should expect much greater alignment of the Harper government with Washington, both overseas and in North America. Toward Greater Opportunism 61 NOTES 1 Justin Massie, “Making Sense of Canada’s ‘Irrational’ International Security Policy: A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures,” International Journal 64, 3 (2009): 625-35; cf. Jonathan Paquin, “Canadian Foreign and Security Policy: Reaching a Balance between Autonomy and North American Harmony in the 21st Century,” Canadian Foreign Policy 15, 2 (2009): 103-12. 2 While some believe that China is hard-balancing the United States, most realist analysts tend to argue that son balancing, or simply bandwagoning, is the present trend. See G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” World Politics 61, 1 (2009): 1-27. 3 See Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, 1 (1998): 144-72; Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29, 2 (2004): 159-201; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,” International Security 34, 4 (2010): 63-95. 4 Robert A. Pape, “Son Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30, 1 (2005): 38. The erst son-balancing arguments were made by Stephen M. Walt, “Keeping the World ‘Od-Balance’: Self-Restraint and US Foreign Policy,” in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 121-54; and Josef Jode, “Defying History and Theory: The United States as the ‘Last Superpower,’” in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 155-80. 5 Pape, ibid., 9-10 and 36; Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 126. 6 Ilai Z. Saltzman, “Son Balancing as Foreign Policy: Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7, 1 (2011): 4. 7 G. John Ikenberry, Aner Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of World Order aner Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 63; Kai He, “Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,” European Journal of International Relations 14, 3 (2008): 493. 8 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 144-45; Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of American Hegemony,” International Security 28, 1 (2003): 5-46; Walt, Taming American Power, 187-91; G. John Ikenberry, Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 28 July 2003), 35; Walt, “Keeping the World ‘OdBalance,’” 139. 62 9 Justin Massie William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, 1 (1999): 9. 10 Ibid., 18; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism aner the Cold War,” International 11 See Alexandru Grigorescu, “East and Central European Countries and the Iraq War: Security 25, 1 (2000): 38. The Choice between ‘Son Balancing’ and ‘Son Bandwagoning,’” Communist and PostCommunist Studies 41, 3 (2008): 281-99; Birthe Hansen, Peter Ton, and Anders Wivel, Security Strategies and American World Order: Lost Power (New York: Routledge, 2009), 11-12. 12 Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World 13 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 67-69. Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition,” in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 55. 14 Cf. Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Proet: Bringing the Revisionist State 15 Thomas H. Mowle and David H. Sacko, “Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar Back In,” International Security 19, 1 (1994): 72-107. World,” Contemporary Security Policy 28, 3 (2007): 606. 16 Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia,” 36. 17 Ibid. With regard to its contribution to NATO, see Galia Press-Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity,” Security Studies 15, 2 (2006): 271-309; Mowle and Sacko, “Global NATO,” 597-618. 18 As argued by David G. Haglund and Stéphane Roussel, “Escott Reid, the North Atlantic Treaty, and Canadian Strategic Culture,” in Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar, ed. Greg Donaghy and Stéphane Roussel (Montreal and Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2004), 45. 19 Press-Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon,” 274. 20 See David Leyton-Brown, “Managing Canada? United States Relations in the Context of Multilateral Alliances,” in America’s Alliances and Canadian-American Relations, ed. Lauren McKinsey and Kim Richard Nossal (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1988); Joel J. Sokolsky, “A Seat at the Table: Canada and Its Alliances,” in Canada’s Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century, ed. B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993). 21 Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), 4 and 117-18. See also Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2002), 12-14. 22 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 67; Robert A. Spencer, Canada in World Adairs: From UN to NATO (1946-1949) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), 265-69. Toward Greater Opportunism 23 63 Lester B. Pearson, “The Development of Canadian Foreign Policy,” Foreign Adairs 30, 1 (October 1951): 24-26. 24 Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 48-50. 25 Charles Létourneau, L’infuence canadienne à travers les opérations de paix, 1956 à 26 Quoted in Paquin, “Canadian Foreign and Security Policy,” 104. 27 Eddie Goldenberg, The Way It Works: Inside Ottawa (Toronto: McClelland and 2005 (Montréal: CEPES/UQAM, 2006). Stewart, 2006), 296. 28 David G. Haglund, “Canada and the Sempiternal NATO Question,” McGill 29 Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel, and Stéphane Paquin, International Policy and 30 Allan Gotlieb, “The Paramountcy of Canada-US Relations,” National Post, 22 May International Review 5 (Spring 2005): 19. Politics in Canada (Toronto: Pearson Education, 2011), 273-86. 2003, A20; Allan Gotlieb, “No Access, No infuence,” National Post, 3 December 2003, A18. 31 Michael Hart, “Lessons from Canada’s History as a Trading Nation,” International Journal 58, 1 (2002-03): 39. 32 See John Holmes, “Shadow and Substance: Diplomatic Relations between Britain and Canada,” in Britain and Canada: Survey of a Changing Relationship, ed. Peter Lyon (London: Frank Cass, 1976), 107; Marie Bernard-Meunier, “The ‘Inevitability’ of North American Integration?” International Journal 60 (2005): 703-11. 33 Desmond Morton, “Defending the Indefensible: Some Historical Perspective on Canadian Defense,” International Journal 42, 4 (1987): 639. 34 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 369. 35 Haglund and Roussel, “Escott Reid,” 53. 36 David G. Haglund and Michel Fortmann, “Canada and the Issue of Homeland Security: Does the Kingston Dispensation Still Hold?” Canadian Military Journal 3, 1 (Spring 2002): 18. 37 For a review, see Justin Massie, “Canada’s (In)dependence in the North American Security Community: The Asymmetrical Norm of Common Fate,” American Review of Canadian Studies 37, 4 (2007): 493-516. 38 US, Department of State, “Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview,” in Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005 (Washington, DC: Ogce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2006), 160-62. 39 Frank P. Harvey, “The Homeland Security Dilemma: Imagination, Failure and the Escalating Costs of Perfecting Security,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, 2 (2007): 310. 40 Kim Richard Nossal, “America’s ‘Most Reliable Ally’? Canada and the Evanescence of the Culture of Partnership,” in Forgotten Partnership Redux: Canada-US Relations in 64 Justin Massie the 21st Century, ed. Greg Anderson and Christopher Sands (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2011). 41 Bruce Gilley, “Middle Powers during Great Power Transitions: China’s Rise and the 42 Ibid., 257. 43 See Justin Massie and Stéphane Roussel, “The Twilight of Internationalism? Future of Canada-US Relations,” International Journal 66, 2 (2011): 256. Neocontinentalism as an Emerging Dominant Idea in Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2013), 36-52. 44 Michael Hart, From Pride to Infuence: Towards a New Canadian Foreign Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008). 45 See Stéphane Roussel, “Pearl Harbor et le World Trade Center: Le Canada face aux États-Unis en période de crise,” Études internationales 33, 4 (2002): 667-95. 46 Colin Robertson, “Taking the Canada-US Partnership to the Next Level,” Policy Options 32 (2011): 76. 47 Quoted in Jed Davis, “Harper Hits Mark with Border Security Message,” The Embassy, 25 February 2009, 3. 48 See Isabelle Rodrigue, “Bouclier antimissile,” Le Droit, 13 January 2006, A6; John Ibbitson, “Shunning Missile Shield Could Be a Grave Error,” Globe and Mail, 12 October 2006, A6. 49 Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008), 8. 50 Stephen Harper, “A Departure from Neutrality,” National Post, 23 May 2003, A18. 51 Philippe Lagassé and Paul Robinson, “Reviving Realism in the Canadian Defence Debate,” Martello Paper 34 (Kingston, ON: Queen’s Centre for International Relations, 2008), 104. 52 Harper, “A Departure from Neutrality,” A18. See also Colin Robertson, “Advancing Canadian Interests with the US,” The Embassy, 4 May 2011. 53 Canada, Governor General, “Strong Leadership. A Better Canada,” Speech from the Throne, 16 October 2007, http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2007/gg/ SO1-1-2007E.pdf. 54 See Annette Hester, Canada as the “Emerging Energy Superpower”: Testing the Case 55 Stephen Harper, “Liberal Damage Control: A Litany of Flip-Flops on Canada-US 56 The war in Libya demonstrated that Germany’s support was not a necessary condition (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Adairs Institute, 2007). Relations,” Policy Options ( June-July 2003): 7. for Canadian participation in a US-led “coalition of the willing.”