Sign in to confirm you’re not a bot
This helps protect our community. Learn more
These chapters are auto-generated

Introduction

0:00

Keynote Definition

0:20

Value of Skepticism

3:39

Machine Learning

4:06

Egg Drop

13:37

Other Winners Curse

14:27

Two Mistakes

16:22

Kingsley

17:01

AI Mission Creep

19:44

AI Workflow

20:33

Conversation

21:05

Tay

22:56

AI Child

23:20

Internet People

24:00

Twitter Answers

25:20

Why Is That

25:45

Race War

26:03

Grammar Lessons

26:33

Prejudice Science

26:59

Sotae Rant

27:35

A Holistic View of Security

28:17

Cartesian Security

28:53

ARPANET

29:19

Cartesian Approach

30:31

Gadgets Are Eternal

31:13

The Liberal Arts Are Getting Upset

32:09

Theyve Made Mistakes Too

32:54

Machine Learning In The Criminal Justice System

33:39

Gender Detection And Faces

34:18

White People Have Faces

34:37

Flashlight Apps

35:22

Technological Manifest Destiny

36:49

Statistics

38:15

Internet of Things

40:58

IOT Security

41:18

TLS

42:01

Cheapness

42:39

Best Seller

43:39

Have I written a paper about IoT

44:28

Why wouldnt you do this

45:52

Avoidable Mistakes

46:46

Conclusion

47:18

Questions

48:07

Would you use machine learning

49:23
USENIX Security '18-Q: Why Do Keynote Speakers Keep Suggesting That Improving Security Is Possible?
4.4KLikes
196,876Views
2018Aug 16
James Mickens, Harvard University Q: Why Do Keynote Speakers Keep Suggesting That Improving Security Is Possible? A: Because Keynote Speakers Make Bad Life Decisions and Are Poor Role Models Some people enter the technology industry to build newer, more exciting kinds of technology as quickly as possible. My keynote will savage these people and will burn important professional bridges, likely forcing me to join a monastery or another penance-focused organization. In my keynote, I will explain why the proliferation of ubiquitous technology is good in the same sense that ubiquitous Venus weather would be good, i.e., not good at all. Using case studies involving machine learning and other hastily-executed figments of Silicon Valley’s imagination, I will explain why computer security (and larger notions of ethical computing) are difficult to achieve if developers insist on literally not questioning anything that they do since even brief introspection would reduce the frequency of git commits. At some point, my microphone will be cut off, possibly by hotel management, but possibly by myself, because microphones are technology and we need to reclaim the stark purity that emerges from amplifying our voices using rams’ horns and sheets of papyrus rolled into cone shapes. I will explain why papyrus cones are not vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks, and then I will conclude by observing that my new start-up papyr.us is looking for talented full-stack developers who are comfortable executing computational tasks on an abacus or several nearby sticks. View the full USENIX Security '18 program at https://www.usenix.org/usenixsecurity...

Follow along using the transcript.

USENIX

38.7K subscribers